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BRINGING CULTURAL GENOCIDE IN BY THE BACKDOOR: 
VICTIM PARTICIPATION AT THE ICC 
Kristina Hon* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cultural genocide is the much-maligned and oft-forgotten 
companion of the simply-termed concept of “genocide.”  Unlike 
genocide—a word used to characterize horrors such as the killings in 
the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and, controversially, Darfur—cultural 
genocide does not require the killing of a single person.1  In fact, no 
physical harm need ever befall a victim of cultural genocide.2  That is 
because cultural genocide3 strips from humanity all manner of 
cultural contributions by human groups, through the destruction of 
those artifacts, documents, books, monuments, or even languages 
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 1  Daphne Anayiotos, The Cultural Genocide Debate: Should the UN Genocide 
Convention Include a Provision on Cultural Genocide or Should the Phenomenon be 
Encompassed in a Separate International Treaty?, 22 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 99, 100 (2009). 
 2  Id.  
 3  Scholars have used various other terms to describe the concept of cultural 
genocide.  “Ethnocide” is the most frequent one; it was originally coined by Raphael 
Lemkin (who also coined “genocide”) who considered it to be interchangeable with 
“genocide.”  RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 n.1 (1944) 
(“Another term could be used for the same idea, namely, ethnocide, consisting of the 
Greek word ‘ethnos’—nation—and the Latin word ‘cide.’”).  Since then, however, it 
has been interpreted to mean “the [systematic] destruction of a culture without the 
killing of its bearers,” which is more along the lines of the contemporary definition 
of cultural genocide.  Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the Seventh 
Generation, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 47, 67 (2008) (quoting FRANK CHALK & KURT 
JONASSOHN, THE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE: ANALYSES AND CASE STUDIES 8–
10 (1990)).  This concept has also been directly, as well as indirectly, expressed in 
international documents.  See, e.g., UNESCO Declaration of San Jose (Unesco and 
the struggle against ethnocide), U.N.E.S.C.O. Doc. FS 82/WF32 (Dec. 11, 1981) 
(“Ethnocide means that an ethnic group is denied the right to enjoy, develop and 
transmit its own culture and its own language, whether collectively or individually.”).  
This tautological distinction has no bearing on this Comment or relevant legal 
analysis. 
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that embody the group’s identity.4  More simply, it is nothing more or 
less than the total destruction of a culture so as to obliterate the 
identity of a people.5  As such, a culture and identity can be destroyed 
“even if all the members of the group [are] still alive.”6 
It is, of course, an extraordinarily rare occurrence that cultural 
genocide happens on its own, without any kind of physical abuse 
simultaneously inflicted on the victims.7  More often than not, 
cultural genocide is wrapped up in, and overshadowed by, physical 
violence.8  A prime example of this is occurring today in Darfur, 
Sudan.9  The forcible displacement and annihilation of villages and 
communal societies is wrenching the three primarily-targeted tribes 
from their land, their communities, and their cultural base.10  The 
Government of Sudan forces, in conjunction with the Janjaweed 
militia, have pursued a ruthless policy of “killings, rapes, [and] 
burning of villages . . . against non-Arab villagers” in “multiple attacks 
over a prolonged period [of time resulting in the destruction of the 
villages] by burning, shelling or bombing, making it impossible for 
the villagers to return.”11  The Arab versus non-Arab tension fueling 
the conflict—and generally underpinning the government’s “Arab-
Islamic supremacist and demonizing policies”—has materialized in 
the violent struggle for the “incentives” of “[t]he property, 
possessions, livestock, and the cultivated land itself” of the non-Arabs 
living in Darfur.12 
Darfur, while being the most recent illustration of genocide, is 
 
 4  G.A. Res. 96(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/96(1) (Dec. 11, 1946); U.N. Secretariat, 
First Draft of the Genocide Convention, U.N. Doc. E/447 (May 1947), available at 
http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/drafts/. 
 5  Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 100. 
 6   Id. at 102 (emphasis omitted). 
 7  See, e.g., Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 104–05 (discussion on Nazi German 
policies). 
 8  Id. 
 9   HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARFUR DESTROYED: ETHNIC CLEANSING BY 
GOVERNMENT AND MILITIA FORCES IN WESTERN SUDAN 5 VOL. 16:6(A) (May 2004), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sudan0504full.pdf 
[hereinafter DARFUR DESTROYED]. 
 10  Micol Sirkin, Expanding the Crime of Genocide to Include Ethnic Cleansing: A Return 
to Established Principles in Light of Contemporary Interpretations, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
489, 516–17 (2010). 
 11  The Crisis in Darfur: Hearing Before the Sen. Foreign Relations Comm., 108th Cong. 
(2004) (statement of Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State), available at 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-a-2004-09-09-8-Text.html. 
 12  JOHN HAGAN & WENONA RYMOND-RICHMOND, DARFUR AND THE CRIME OF 
GENOCIDE 5 (2009). 
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but one in a succession.  The term “genocide” was coined in 1943 by 
a Polish law professor, Raphael Lemkin,13 as a combination of the 
Greek word “genos” or “genus” meaning race, and the Latin word 
“cide” meaning killing (as in homicide or fratricide).14  He used it to 
describe the Armenian decimation by the Turks during World War I, 
but the concept became firmly embedded in legal and political 
terminology when he applied it to the German Nazis’ policies to 
exterminate the Jews and the Roma throughout Europe prior to and 
during World War II.15  Lemkin’s definition of genocide was a very 
broad and holistic one, and reflective of the wide variety of 
destructive measures employed by the Nazis, encompassing the 
“disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, 
language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of 
national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, 
health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to 
such groups.”16  For Lemkin, the destruction of the lives of the victims 
seemed almost an afterthought, as if taking their lives was, while 
cruel, an act of mercy in comparison to the annihilation unleashed 
on their culture, society, and identity.17 
Applying his own definition of genocide to the Nazi practices 
during World War II, Lemkin concluded that genocide had occurred 
through a synchronized attack on different aspects of life of 
the captive peoples: in the political field (by destroying 
institutions of self-government and imposing a German 
pattern of administration, and through colonization by 
 
 13  Raphael Lemkin was born in the early 1900s in eastern Poland and worked in 
Poland “as a lawyer, prosecutor and university teacher.”  WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, 
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2000).  In 1939, he fled Poland, escaping the 
Jewish persecution, eventually settling in the United States.  Id.  By that time, he was 
renowned as an international criminal law scholar, and taught at universities across 
the United States.  Id.  In 1943, he published his seminal book Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe, consolidating and expounding upon the legal theories behind genocide and 
exhaustively analyzing Nazi policies and practices within Germany and the occupied 
territories in light of international criminal law.  Id. at 26–27. 
 14  LEMKIN, supra note 3, at xi; Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 100. 
 15  Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 99; see LEMKIN, supra note 3. 
 16  LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 79. 
 17  In his book, Lemkin wrote,   
Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate 
destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of 
all members of a nation.  It is intended rather to signify a coordinated 
plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential 
foundations of life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the 
groups themselves. 
Id. 
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Germans); the social field (by disrupting the social 
cohesion of the nation involved and killing or removing 
elements such as the intelligentsia, which provide spiritual 
leadership—according to Hitler’s statement in Mein Kampf, 
“the greatest of spirits can be liquidated if its bearer is 
beaten to death with a rubber truncheon”); in the cultural 
field (by prohibiting or destroying cultural institutions and 
cultural activities; by substituting vocational education for 
education in the liberal arts, in order to prevent humanistic 
thinking, which the occupant considers dangerous because 
it promotes national thinking); in the economic field (by 
shifting the wealth to Germans and by prohibiting the 
exercise of trades and occupations by people who do not 
promote Germanism “without reservations”); in the 
biological field (by a policy of depopulation and by 
promoting procreation by Germans in the occupied 
countries); in the field of physical existence (by introducing 
a starvation rationing system for non-Germans and by mass 
killings, mainly of Jews, Poles, Slovenes, and Russians); in 
the religious field (by interfering with the activities of the 
Church, which in many countries provides not only spiritual 
but also national leadership); in the field of morality (by 
attempts to create an atmosphere of moral debasement 
through promoting pornographic publications and motion 
pictures, and the excessive consumption of alcohol).18 
The literal translation of genocide is “the killing of a race,” and 
of course the most expeditious and easiest way to achieve the physical 
obliteration of the very existence, nay the very foundation, of a 
particular group of people is by destroying the people themselves.19  
That is not to say, however, that cultural genocide does not happen, 
and has not happened, independent of physical violence.20  Yet it is 
far more frequently the case that cultural destruction and 
obliteration occur within the context of an armed conflict, blurring 
the lines between culture, identity, and regular violence and 
extermination.  Darfur is one such compelling example.  When 
courts and tribunals prosecute the physical genocide, the cultural 
genocide is subsumed within it, and is thus punished as well.21  But 
that still cannot sufficiently address the gravity of the harm being 
 
 18  LEMKIN, supra note 3, at xi–xii. 
 19  Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 100. 
 20  Forcible transfer of children is one such example; see infra note 4733 for a 
historical overview. 
 21  Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 124. 
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done, as “[t]he living may suffer cultural genocide without death,” 
and without being “vindicated by the prosecution of physical 
genocide.”22 
The comparative lack of severity, potentially, of cultural 
genocide compared to physical genocide has led to the 
marginalization of the concept and a lack of appreciation—legal and 
societal—for the destructive effect that obliteration of a cultural 
identity has on its people, whether or not accompanied by killing.23  
While cultural genocide is not a distinct crime under international 
law and is not included in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), a new feature in the Statute allowing for the 
legal participation of qualified victims has the potential to inject a 
cultural perspective into the proceedings.24  The concept is still 
largely theoretical, but this Comment will argue that cultural 
genocide deserves to be recognized; it would therefore behoove the 
prosecutor and the legal representatives of the victims to pay special 
attention to the impact that a more culturally-nuanced approach 
would have on the prosecution of genocide and war crimes.  This 
could become particularly important in the trial of Sudanese 
president Omar al-Bashir, the only person thus far to be indicted by 
the ICC on charges of genocide.25  More universally, however, 
establishing a precedent for the inclusion of the cultural background 
of a conflict and a mechanism for addressing harms inflicted upon 
that culture is imperative because the unfortunate fact is that cultural 
genocide is likely to occur again in the future, if the past is any guide.  
When it does, there must be ways to address it, directly and indirectly. 
Part II of this Comment will provide an overview of the evolution 
of the legal status of cultural genocide.  Part III will discuss how the 
innovative victim participation model at the ICC works and how it can 
be used to integrate evidence of cultural genocide in proving the 
specific intent required for the conviction of the crime of genocide.  
Part IV will apply the theoretical principles enumerated in Part III to 
the Omar al-Bashir case, by analyzing and extrapolating from the pre-
trial chamber’s initial refusal but eventual grant of a warrant of arrest 
for al-Bashir for genocide. 
 
 22  Id. at 125. 
 23  See infra Part II.A.1 for discussion on the second justification for excluding 
cultural genocide from the Genocide Convention. 
 24  See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 68, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 25  Second Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-95, July 12, 2010. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURAL GENOCIDE 
Raphael Lemkin’s comprehensive definition of genocide—
encompassing harm done to all aspects of human life—provided the 
ideal starting point for the creation of a legal regime to identify, 
define, and criminalize genocide.26  Despite much discussion about, 
and interpretations of, cultural genocide during the drafting sessions 
of the Genocide Convention, and several attempts to include it in the 
final version, the concept was nevertheless excluded.  Since then, the 
international legal community has slowly raised the legal status of 
cultural genocide to its current role as one means of showing specific 
intent to commit genocide under the Genocide Convention and the 
respective statutes of the international criminal tribunals and courts.27 
A. The Genocide Convention 
The atrocities committed by the Nazi regime in Europe during 
the Second World War so shocked the conscience of the 
international community that the states were galvanized into giving 
these acts “a name and a legal definition” so as to better come to 
terms with them.28  The newly-created United Nations General 
Assembly (GA) convened in 1946 and passed Resolution 96(1), which 
made genocide an international crime, requested member states to 
pass domestic legislation punishing and preventing the crime, and 
instructed the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to begin 
drafting an international convention delineating the crime.29  The 
committee of experts selected to review the preliminary document 
included Raphael Lemkin, and his influence was clearly visible in the 
drafts, especially the first one.30 
Lemkin’s definition of genocide encompassed three primary 
types of genocide: physical, biological, and cultural.31  Physical 
genocide was defined as “the tangible annihilation of the group by 
killing and maiming its members,” and Lemkin provided a range of 
examples, from Nazi policies of racial discrimination in the 
distribution or rationing of food, endangering of health, and mass 
 
 26  LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 79. 
 27   See infra Part II.C.1. 
 28  Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 112. 
 29  G.A. Res. 96(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/96(1) (Dec. 11, 1946); Nehemiah 
Robinson, The Genocide Convention: Its Origins and Interpretations, 40 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 315, app. 2 (2007). 
 30  Robinson, supra note 29, at 2. 
 31  LEMKIN, supra note 3, at xi–xii, 82–90; Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 102. 
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killings.32  He defined biological genocide as the “imposi[tion of] 
measures calculated to decrease the reproductive capacity of the 
group,” including policies of separation of the sexes and deportation, 
involuntary sterilization, and undernourishment of the parents.33  
Broadly defined, cultural genocide encompassed “attacks [beyond] 
the physical and/or biological elements of a group . . . seek[ing] to 
eliminate its wider institutions.”34  Such an elimination policy could 
be accomplished through the prohibition of the use of a local 
language and schools, the restriction or ban of artistic, literary, and 
cultural activities, and the destruction or confiscation of “national 
treasures, libraries, archives, museums, artifacts, and art galleries.”35  
These three main forms of genocide also subsumed additional 
dimensions or “techniques” of genocide, including “political, 
social, . . . economic, . . . religious and moral” genocide.36 
The provisions on genocide contained in the first draft that 
Lemkin and his colleagues reviewed bore a striking resemblance to 
the trichotomy framework Lemkin had enunciated.37  It made each 
type of genocide a separate crime, defining it and enumerating the 
actions that would be punishable under the convention.38  The crime 
of cultural genocide was defined as 
[d]estroying the specific characteristics of the group by: (a) 
forcible transfer of children to another human group; or 
(b) forced and systematic exile of individuals representing 
the culture of a group; or (c) prohibition of the use of the 
national language even in private intercourse; or (d) 
systematic destruction of books printed in the national 
language or of religious works or prohibition of new 
publications; or (e) systematic destruction of historical or 
religious monuments or their diversion to alien uses, 
destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of 
 
 32  LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 87–90; David Nersessian, Rethinking Cultural Genocide 
Under International Law, Human Rights Dialogue: Cultural Rights, CARNEGIE COUNCIL 
(Apr. 22, 2005), http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/publications/dialogue 
/2_12/section_1/5139.html. 
 33  LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 86; Nersessian, supra note 32. 
 34  Nersessian, supra note 32. 
 35  LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 84; Nersessian, supra note 32. 
 36  LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 87–90; Kurt Mundorff, Other People’s Children: A Textual 
and Contextual Interpretation of the Genocide Convention, Article 2(e), 50 HARV. INT’L L. J. 
61, 74 (2009); Nersessian, supra note 32. 
 37  Compare Lemkin, supra note 3, at xi, 82–90, with First Draft of the Genocide 
Convention, supra note 4. 
 38  First Draft of the Genocide Convention, supra note 4. 
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historical, artistic, or religious value and of objects used in 
religious worship.39 
The listing of the specific criminal actions tried to incorporate, as 
best as possible, the various facets of the destruction of a cultural 
identity, in some ways going beyond what Lemkin had envisioned, 
such as with the inclusion of forcible transfer of children.40 
After the first draft was submitted to the United Nations (U.N.) 
member states, and ECOSOC had received the states’ comments and 
observations, a new ad hoc committee was formed to draft a second 
version of the convention.41  The resulting draft eliminated the 
previous draft’s trichotomy by combining physical and biological 
genocide into a single article; it also drastically curtailed the 
definition of cultural genocide, excising all references to acts 
committed against people, focusing strictly on the destruction of 
tangible items.42  The only exception pertained to the use of a local or 
group language.43  The punishable actions, therefore, included only 
the 
prohibiti[on of] the use of the language of the group in 
daily intercourse or in schools, or the printing and 
circulation of publications in the language of the group; 
[and the] destr[uction] or preventi[on of] the use of 
libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places 
of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the 
group.44 
The final version eventually submitted to the GA for adoption by 
the states parties—what then became the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide45—had 
entirely re-worked the breakdown of the types of genocide.  The 
distinctions between physical, biological, and cultural genocide had 
been removed, leaving only a list of five specifically enumerated acts 
 
 39  Id. at art. II(3). 
 40  See generally LEMKIN, supra note 3, at 84–85. 
 41  Robinson, supra note 29, at 5. 
 42  U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Ad  Hoc Comm., Second Draft of the Genocide 
Convention, U.N. Doc. E/AC.25.1–28, art. III (May 10, 1948), available at 
http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/drafts/.   
 43  Id. at art. III(1). 
 44  Id. at art. III. 
 45  The Convention entered into force in January 1951, after the UN General 
Assembly adopted it on 9 October 1948.  SCHABAS, supra note 13, at 3; Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260A (III), U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/260 (III)A (Dec. 9, 1948) [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
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that were to be considered genocide.46  The only remnant of cultural 
genocide was the forcible transfer of children as one of the five acts, 
the inclusion of which had been proposed by the Greek delegation 
and approved.47  Two final attempts had been made to reinstate 
cultural genocide—in one form or another—into the Convention but 
neither were able to garner support, and so both failed.48  The 
concept had been exhaustively discussed in all drafting sessions and 
the overwhelming majority of the delegates agreed that the concept 
was best “addressed elsewhere in the United Nations as a human 
rights issue.”49 
The failure to include any substantive reference to cultural 
genocide did not go unnoticed by some delegates, prompting 
statements of admonition and regret.50  A Pakistani representative 
lamented the exclusion of cultural genocide, protesting that the 
focus only on physical destruction of life was misplaced, because 
physical genocide is simply the means by which to achieve the end, 
namely “[the destruction of the] values and the very soul of a 
national, racial or religious group”—or in other words, a culture.51  
 
 46   Genocide Convention, supra note 45, at art. II. 
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing seriously 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.  
Id. 
 47  Robinson, supra note 29, at 18.  The forcible removal and transfer of 
children—which destroys culture through the forced assimilation of the future 
generation—has a history of occurrence, as it occurred in Cornwellian England, in 
Australia, Canada and the United States in the nineteenth century, in Switzerland 
against the Roma, and in the Soviet Union against indigenous Siberians, in the 
twentieth century.  Mundorff, supra note 36, at 63–64; Robinson, supra note 29, at 18.  
More contemporarily, during the Cold War, Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaucescu 
severely discriminated against and repressed ethnic Hungarians on such a scale as to 
constitute cultural genocide.  Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 128.  Examples of 
governmental policies employed included: “1. elimination of minority educational 
institutions, 2. suppression of minority languages, 3. falsification of historical data 
and population statistics, 4. confiscation of cultural archives, 5. obstruction of contact 
with relatives abroad, and 6. dissolution of ethnic communities.”  Id. at 129. 
 48  Mundorff, supra note 36, at 77.  One proposal was by the Soviet Union, which 
was voted down, and the other was by Venezuela, which later withdrew it.  Id. 
 49   SCHABAS, supra note 13, at 73.  For a more in-depth discussion, see Part II.A.1. 
 50   See generally Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 114–15. 
 51   Id. 
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Thus, if physical genocide was to be a crime, so too should cultural 
genocide.52  Failure to properly deter crimes against culture, 
religions, or language could lead to brazen attacks against them, 
which would be outside the scope of international criminal law.53 
1. Justifications for the Exclusion of Cultural Genocide 
Despite such strong arguments in favor of criminalizing cultural 
genocide, the concept was left out of the Convention for five 
reasons.54  The first was that the concept was simply too imprecise.55  
While it is true that the concept encompasses a broad spectrum of 
crimes, the two definitions promulgated in the drafts of the 
convention would seem to be evidence that in fact, the concept can 
be sufficiently concretely defined, even if controversially.56  The 
second reason was the comparative lack of severity of the physical 
harm; the gap between the severity of mass murder and the closure of 
libraries was just too large.57  This is an undeniable fact, since human 
life is not threatened by the banning of books or use of languages to 
the same extent as physical violence.  The underpinnings of society, 
culture, and communities, however, are so threatened by prohibitions 
on books and languages, thereby lowering quality of life and 
weakening identity. 
The third reason was that many delegations felt that cultural 
destruction was best dealt with in “the sphere of protection of 
minorities” or human rights law, and therefore outside the 
framework of international criminal law.58  This justification, while 
valid on its face, does not consider that it is not always the majority 
that oppresses the minority, and that groups of equal strength and 
population might also wish to eliminate the other’s culture in a fight 
for dominance and power.  Also, it presupposes that cultural 
genocide—or cultural destruction—will be easier to articulate as a 
different branch of international law.  Relatedly, states felt that there 
were valid and legitimate justifications for the implementation of 
 
 52   Id. at 115. 
 53   Id. 
 54   Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 115; Robinson, supra note 29, at 18–19; Sirkin, 
supra note 10, at 504. 
 55   Robinson, supra note 29, at 19. 
 56  See First Draft of the Genocide Convention, supra note 4, at art. I(II)(3); Second 
Draft of the Genocide Convention, supra note 42, at art. III. 
 57   Robinson, supra note 29, at 19. 
 58   Id. 
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measures domestically to incorporate and assimilate minorities.59  
Indeed there are such justifiable reasons; the point of the 
criminalization of cultural genocide, however, is to protect groups 
against measures and actions that would go beyond the realm of the 
legitimate and into the realm of outright annihilation and 
destruction.  That is precisely what the concept is designed to 
safeguard.  The final reason was that codification of cultural genocide 
would be best deferred to a separate international convention, to 
allow for proper and full development of all its legal nuances.60  This 
reason was undoubtedly an altruistic one, but a “Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Cultural Genocide” has never 
materialized; as such, the international community missed the perfect 
opportunity to make cultural genocide a definite, punishable crime 
under international law, leaving its status under international law 
vague and its potential unrealized. 
B. Subsequent Development of Cultural Rights 
Since then, various international treaties and declarations have 
incorporated references to cultural rights, mainly as human rights, 
but none have ever re-articulated the concept of cultural genocide.61  
For example, the International Bill of Rights—composed of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR),62 the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),63 and the 
 
 59   Sirkin, supra note 10, at 504. 
 60   Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 115. 
 61   Another difference is that many of the rights can be classified as “freedom to” 
(or positive) rights rather than “freedom from” (or negative) rights, meaning that 
peoples are affirmatively allowed to participate and engage in various cultural 
activities, as opposed to being granted protection from governmental interference in 
those activities.  Frank B. Cross, The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 864 
(2001) (A negative right “is a right to be free from government, while [a positive 
right] is a right to command government action.”).  The Genocide Convention 
enshrines “freedom from” rights.  See generally Athanasios Yupsanis, The Concept and 
Categories of Cultural Rights in International Law—Their Broad Sense and the Relevant 
Clauses of the International Human Rights Treaties, 37 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 207, 
220–24, 233–34 (2010).  The distinction is largely irrelevant for this Comment.   
 62  “Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed 
their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human 
person and in the equal rights of men and women. . . .”  Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 63  “Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political freedom and 
freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby 
everyone can enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, social and 
cultural rights . . . .” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR)64—provides that human rights can be classified into five 
categories: civil, political, economic, social, and cultural.65  But of 
these groups, civil and political rights receive the greatest legal and 
scholarly attention; cultural, the least.66  The biggest exception to this 
is the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), whose documents embrace a broad concept of culture as 
a way of life: a “set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and 
emotional features of society or a social group, and . . . 
encompass[ing], in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of 
living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.”67  Nevertheless, 
the UNESCO definition is not a legal definition; it is not contained in 
a document under which cultures may bring suit against their 
aggressors (whether domestically or internationally) for 
encroachment on their social and cultural cohesion.68 
The international document that comes closest to protecting 
against interference with, and destruction of, culture—the essence of 
cultural genocide—is the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.69  Articles 7 and 8 both grant affirmative rights 
stemming from the enjoyment and proliferation of a culture and 
 
2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Mar. 23, 1976). 
 64   “Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can 
only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone can enjoy his economic, 
social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights. . . .”  International 
Covenant in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Jan. 3, 1976). 
 65   Yupsanis, supra note 61, at 207. 
 66  Id. at 208. 
 67  UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, U.N.E.S.C.O. Res. 
31/25, Annex I, U.N. Doc. __ (Nov. 2, 2001), available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13179&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 
 68   The principles in the Declaration are enumerations of positive rights.  See 
discussion supra note 47.  As they are much harder to enforce, the Declaration 
confines itself to stating that  
the Member States recommend that the Director-General take the 
objectives set forth in this Action Plan into account in the 
implementation of UNESCO’s programmes and communicate it to 
institutions of the United Nations system and to other 
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned 
with a view to enhancing the synergy of actions in favour of cultural 
diversity.   
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, supra note 67, at Annex II. 
 69  U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, 
Annex, art. 7 & 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295/Annex (Sept. 13, 2007).   
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protect against “assimilation or destruction of [that] culture.”70  This 
is a progressive step, but it suffers from two main drawbacks.  First, 
the Declaration was created almost sixty years after the adoption of 
the Genocide Convention, meaning that any violations in the nature 
of those two articles committed during that time are essentially 
sheltered from prosecution.71  Even still, as with the UNESCO 
declaration, there is no avenue for international redress.72  Second, it 
applies only to the indigenous, leaving out minorities.73  Most other 
international documents that deal with culture either protect 
tangible items or the rights of specific groups.74 
C. International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and its 
Jurisprudence 
The next impetus for the international community to potentially 
address the absence of cultural genocide from any international 
treaty or convention was in the early 1990s, as the United Nations 
dealt with the aftermath of the wars in Yugoslavia.75  In order to 
 
 70  Id.   
Article 7.  1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and 
mental integrity, liberty and security of person.  2. Indigenous peoples 
have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as 
distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or 
any other act of violence, including forcibly removing children of the 
group to another group.  Article 8.  1. Indigenous peoples and 
individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or 
destruction of their culture. . . .  
Id. 
 71  MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 926 (6th ed. 2008) (“In the absence of 
contrary intention, the treaty will not operate retroactively so that its provisions will 
not bind a party as regards any facts, acts or situations prior to that state’s acceptance 
of the treaty.”). 
 72   The Declaration confines itself to stating that “the United Nations, its bodies, 
including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and specialized agencies, 
including at the country level, and States shall promote respect for and full 
application of the provisions of this Declaration and follow up the effectiveness of 
this Declaration.”  U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 
69, at art. 42. 
 73  Yupsanis, supra note 61, at 230.  The distinction is important because while the 
indigenous may be a minority within a country, “minorit[ies]” are not otherwise 
legally defined under international law and are not recognized as a “people” and 
therefore are not entitled to such rights as self-determination.  Id. at 230–31. 
 74  Such conventions include the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention; the 
2005 UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity; the 1989 Convention on the Rights 
of the Child; the 2003 Convention on Migrant Workers; and the 1981 Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.  Anayiotos, supra 
note 1, at 115–19; Yupsanis, supra note 61, at 219. 
 75  Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 119. 
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provide accountability for the terrible crimes being committed, the 
U.N. Security Council established the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993.76  The tribunal 
was accompanied by, and founded on, a statute by which to prosecute 
those accused of the crimes enumerated within it.77  The statute 
included provisions for the punishment of grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 (article 2); violations of the laws or 
customs of war (article 3); genocide (article 4); and crimes against 
humanity (article 5).78  In articulating the definition of genocide, the 
statute repeats verbatim the iteration contained in the Genocide 
Convention.79  Accordingly, it does not include cultural genocide as a 
punishable crime. 
That did not mean, however, that cultural genocide as a concept 
was legally irrelevant; the ICTY first encountered the task of 
determining the legal status of cultural genocide in Prosecutor v. 
Radislav Krstić.80  Krstić was charged with genocide, complicity to 
commit genocide, extermination as a crime against humanity, 
murder as a crime against humanity, murder as a violation of the laws 
of war, and persecution.81 
Krstić had been a commander in the Bosnian Serb Army whose 
corps had participated in the attack on the United Nations safe area 
at Srebrenica, resulting in the deaths of thousands of Bosnian Muslim 
men and boys.82  In its 260-page judgment, the trial chamber83 was 
obliged to assess the meaning of the words “intent to destroy,” proof 
 
 76  Id. 
 77  Id. at 119–20. 
 78  The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to 
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), Annex, delivered to the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter Report of the 
Secretary-General]. 
 79   Anayiotos, supra note 1, at 120. 
 80   Id. at 121. 
 81   Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Initial Indictment, ¶¶ 20–30 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 30, 1998). 
 82   Id. at ¶¶ 2–12. 
 83  The ICTY is composed of the following organs: three trial chambers and an 
appeals chamber, the prosecutor, and the registry.  Report of the Secretary-General, 
supra note 78, at Annex art. 11.  The trial chamber is charged with reviewing the 
indictments of each accused, confirming or dismissing them; issuing “orders and 
warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender or transfer” of the accused; conducting 
the trial; rendering a judgment; and “impos[ing] sentences and penalties on persons 
convicted of serious violations of international humanitarian law.”  Id. at art. 19–20, 
23. 
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of which is requisite for a conviction of genocide.84  After it 
determined that specific intent—or dolus specialis—was required for 
genocide, and not merely a “general awareness” of the consequences 
of one’s actions, the chamber discussed the “manner in which the 
destruction of a group may be implemented . . . .”85  The chamber 
acknowledged that, aside from physical acts, “one may also conceive 
of destroying a group through purposeful eradication of its culture 
and identity resulting in the eventual extinction of the group as an 
entity distinct from the remainder of the community.”86 
Continuing its analysis, the trial chamber conceded that as 
Lemkin had originally conceived, genocide encompassed “all forms 
of destruction of a group as a distinct social entity.”87  Such a broad 
interpretation of the definition resembled what had been 
incorporated as a crime against humanity into the Statute of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal established after World War II.88  This definition 
was then later subsumed into the ICTY statute (and even later into 
the Rome Statute forming the ICC), as persecution under the 
category of crime against humanity.89 
Nevertheless, and despite other developments in international 
law,90 the trial chamber stayed within the conservative parameters of 
the language in the statute and limited the definition of genocide to 
 
 84  Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), ¶¶ 569–
70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001).  This high standard of 
intent is present in the Genocide Convention, the ICTY statute, the statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the Rome Statute of the ICC.  See 
Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 6; Genocide Convention, supra note 45, at art. 2; 
S.C. Res. 955, Annex, art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994); Report of the 
Secretary-General, supra note 78, at Annex art. 4.  
 85  Krstić (trial chamber judgment), at ¶¶ 571, 574. 
 86  Id. at ¶ 574. 
 87  Id. at ¶ 575. 
 88  Id.  At Nuremberg, the U.S. Military Tribunal had interpreted persecution in 
the Ulrich Greifelt et al. case broadly, to cover extermination of the characteristics of 
ethnic and national groups.  Id. at ¶ 575.  “The acts, conduct, plans and 
enterprises . . . were carried out as part of a systematic program of genocide, aimed 
at the destruction of foreign nations and ethnic groups, in part by murderous 
extermination, and in part by elimination and suppression of national 
characteristics.”  Id. at n.1282 (quoting U.S.A. v. Ulrich Greifelt et al., TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS, VOL. XIV (1948)). 
 89  Krstić (trial chamber judgment), at ¶ 575. 
 90  Such developments include a U.N. General Assembly resolution and a 
decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court, both of which recognized 
ethnic cleansing as a form of genocide.  Id. at ¶¶ 578–79.  A judicial opinion by a 
domestic court is not generally considered as a source of international law.  See 
generally Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, U.N. Charter Annex. 
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those physical and biological acts that cause the destruction of a 
group—those five specifically enumerated in its statute, as taken from 
the Genocide Convention.91  “Hence, an enterprise attacking only the 
cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order to 
annihilate these elements which give to that group its own identity 
distinct from the rest of the community would not fall under the 
definition of genocide.”92 
1. Cultural Genocide as Proof of Specific Intent 
The chamber did recognize, however, that very often, physical 
and biological attacks are accompanied by destruction of “cultural 
and religious property and symbols of the targeted group,” in an 
effort to obliterate all evidence of that group’s identity.93  As such, 
those types of acts—if substantiated by the evidence—may well be 
considered as part of the proof of the specific intent to physically 
destroy that group.94  Indeed, that is what the trial chamber did; in 
finding Krstić guilty of genocide, it considered as evidence of the 
requisite specific intent “the deliberate destruction of mosques and 
houses belonging to” the Bosnian Muslims.95 
Appeal Chamber Judge Mohamed Shahabuddeen supported the 
proposition the trial chamber enumerated in its judgment against 
Krstić—that evidence of cultural genocide or destruction can be used 
to supplement a finding of specific intent.96  In his partial dissenting 
opinion appended to the chamber’s judgment of the Krstić case, 
Judge Shahabuddeen articulated a more nuanced version of cultural 
genocide.97  He recognized that cultural genocide was intentionally 
left out of the Genocide Convention, but stated that: 
If those characteristics [—often intangible—that ‘bind . . . 
together a collection of people as a social unit’] have been 
 
 91  Krstić (trial chamber judgment), at ¶ 580.   
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id.   
 96  Krstić’s conviction of genocide was replaced by a conviction of aiding and 
abetting the commission of genocide, based on a finding by the Appeals Chamber of 
a lack of specific intent, but the legal principles enumerated by the trial chamber as 
regards evidence of cultural destruction as one indication of such intent remained 
unchanged.  Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Appeals 
Chamber), ¶¶ 134, 144 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004). 
 97  Id. (appeals chamber, partial dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen); 
William A. Schabas, Genocide Law in a Time of Transition: Recent Developments in the Law 
of Genocide, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 161, 171–72 (2008). 
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destroyed in pursuance of the intent with which a listed act 
of a physical or biological nature was done, it is not 
convincing to say that the destruction, though effectively 
obliterating the group, is not genocide because the 
obliteration was not physical or biological.98 
The crime of genocide “is a crime against human groups,” “not a 
crime against individuals.”99  As such, if acts taken to destroy the 
tangible and intangible characteristics of such a human group 
effectively lead to its destruction, it should be no defense against a 
charge of genocide that the specific acts committed were not those 
specifically listed as physical or biological in the ICTY Statute or the 
Genocide Convention.100  The genocidal intent must always be to 
destroy the group; but evidence of such intent should not be—and 
historically is not—limited to physical or biological acts.101  Therefore, 
acts of cultural destruction should be weighed as heavily as the 
physical and biological acts in determining genocide. 
ICTY chambers adjudicating other genocide cases have 
interpreted Judge Shahabuddeen’s dissent to support an expansion 
of the definition of genocide in the grey areas, where ethnic hatred—
and resulting cultural crimes—is rampant, but there is little evidence 
that actual physical destruction of the people was intended.102  “The 
destruction of culture may serve evidentially to confirm an intent, to 
be gathered from other circumstances, to destroy the group, as such,” 
without any manifestation of physical violence.103 
The trial chamber in Prosecutor v. Blagojević adopted the 
dichotomy between requiring the criminal acts to be physical or 
biological, but allowing the intent to take other forms enumerated by 
Judge Shahabuddeen.104  The chamber recognized, as Judge 
 
 98  Krstić (appeals chamber judgment, partial dissenting opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen), at ¶ 50. 
 99   Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 100  Id. 
 101  Id. at ¶ 51. 
 102  Schabas, supra note 97, at 172. 
 103  Krstić (appeals chamber judgment, partial dissenting opinion of Judge 
Shahabuddeen), at ¶ 53. 
 104  Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 659 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 17, 2005).  Blagojević was charged with 
complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or 
customs of war.  Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-53-PT, Initial Joinder 
Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 22, 2002).  He was in 
command of one of the brigades in charge of securing the “safe area” of Srebrenica, 
“and directly participated in the actual capture” of the area and resulting executions.  
Id. at ¶ 1.   
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Shahabuddeen had made clear, that while the “listed acts of 
genocide” must be physical or biological in nature, “the same is not 
required for the intent.”105  The intent need not be limited to 
inferences from physical and biological acts.  Cultural acts may be 
considered, since a group whose destruction is intended “is 
comprised [not only] of its individuals, but also of its history, 
traditions, the relationship between its members, the relationship 
with other groups, [and] the relationship with the land.”106  
Accordingly, the Blagojevich court recognized that forcible transfer 
(exceeding “mere displacement”) can be genocide if “the 
consequence is dissolution of the group.”107  Forced migration of 
civilians and large-scale deportation would also fall under the same 
category.108  Rape and other acts of sexual violence, as acknowledged 
by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), also serve 
as evidence used to show intent to destroy.109 
The chamber also looked favorably upon a decision by the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany,110 which, in deciding to 
expand the interpretation of Germany’s statutory definition of 
genocide beyond physical and biological extermination, “found that 
[doing so] would not be in violation of international law and that ‘it 
has generally been accepted that the limit of the meaning of the text 
has been exceeded only when the intention to destroy relates solely to 
a group’s cultural identity,’ that is, cultural genocide.”111  While the 
ICTY has not extended the statutory interpretation of genocide to 
include cultural genocide, the premise behind such an expansion was 
further expounded upon in Prosecutor v. Krajisnik,112 as the court 
 
 105  Blagojević (trial chamber judgment), at ¶ 659. 
 106  Id. at ¶ 666. 
 107  Id. at ¶ 660. 
 108  Id. at ¶ 663. 
 109  Id. at ¶ 662. 
 110  Prosecutor v. Nikola Jorgić, Judgment, Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvR 
1290/00 (Dec. 12, 2000). 
 111  Blagojević (trial chamber judgment), at ¶ 664 (emphasis added).  The Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany in Jorgić upheld an interpretation of “destroy” to 
mean “the destruction of ‘the group as a social unit in its specificity, uniqueness and 
feeling of belonging [and that] the biological-physical destruction of the group is not 
required.’”  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 112   Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 854 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2006).  Krajisnik was charged with 
genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of the laws and [sic] customs of war, 
and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.  Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No. IT-
00-39-T, Amended Indictment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 21, 
2000).  With the goal of freeing Bosnia from unwanted Serbs, Krajisnik engaged in 
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dissected some of the philosophy behind the actus reus/mens rea 
dichotomy: 
It is not accurate to speak of ‘the group’ as being amenable 
to physical or biological destruction.  Its members are, of 
course, physical or biological beings, but the bonds among 
its members, as well as such aspects of the group as its 
members’ culture and beliefs, are neither physical nor 
biological.  Hence [under] the Genocide Convention’s 
‘intent to destroy’ the group cannot sensibly be regarded as 
reducible to an intent to destroy the group physically or 
biologically. . . .113 
Nevertheless, the court declined to extend genocide beyond the 
physical and biological acts listed in the ICTY Statute.114 
2. Additional Cultural Provisions in the ICTY Statute 
Aside from Article 4 of the ICTY statute, which deals with 
genocide, Articles 2 and 3—on grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions and violations of the laws of war, respectively—allow for 
the prosecution of crimes against property.  These could potentially 
encompass cultural property, under provisions relating to: “extensive 
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;” “wanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by 
military necessity;” “seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to 
institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and 
sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science” from 
Article 3(d); and finally “plunder of public or private property.”115 
But none of these four provisions provide for any kind of 
protection against destruction of culture through means other than 
the destruction of tangible objects.  Yet culture, as the cumulative 
sense of identity that is built through both its embodiment in physical 
objects, as well as intangible ephemera, can be threatened through 
other means.  There is no comparable criminalization of acts such as 
the prohibition of the use of local and native languages and forcible 
 
“the creation of impossible conditions of life, involving persecution and terror 
tactics . . . ; the deportation of those who were reluctant to leave; and the liquidation 
of others.”  Id. at ¶ 6. 
 113  Krajisnik (trial chamber judgment), at ¶ 854 n.1701. 
 114  See generally id. at ¶ 854, as a general statement of the legal use of other types 
of proof of intent, including, for example, the transfer of children, severing of bonds 
among group members, and deliberate forcible transfer. 
 115  Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 78, at Annex arts. 2(d), 3(b), 3(d), 
3(e). 
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displacement.116 
Such types of activities are also legally considered to be 
components of the concept of ethnic cleansing.117  The first problem 
with such a characterization is that there is no formal legal definition, 
although a U.N. Commission of Experts—investigating the atrocities 
in Yugoslavia—defined it as a purposeful policy designed by one 
ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring 
means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group 
from certain geographic areas. . . [for the] purpose [of] occupation 
of territory to the exclusion of the purged group or groups.118 
The second problem is that under the development of 
international tribunals’ jurisprudence, ethnic cleansing is recognized 
neither as a stand-alone genocidal policy nor as a crime unto itself.119  
Interpretation of the phrase “to destroy” in the definition of genocide 
“excludes” cultural genocide because destruction of a culture does 
not physically destroy the victims; by extension, ethnic cleansing, 
which also does not intentionally destroy the people—rather only 
displaces them—is equally precluded from falling under the crime of 
genocide.120  Ethnic cleansing has only been acknowledged as 
evidence of genocidal intent (like cultural genocide), meaning that 
barring the additional commission of an enumerated crime in the 
Genocide Convention (or ICTY Statute or Rome Statute), a state 
policy of ethnic cleansing is not genocide.121  In the same vein, the 
acts committed under a policy of ethnic cleansing are not punishable 
as one coherent crime; rather, each act is prosecuted on an 
individual basis either as a war crime or crime against humanity 
under the various provisions of the international criminal statutes.122  
This disconnect is notwithstanding the fact that the U.N. GA passed a 
resolution in 1992 recognizing ethnic cleansing as a form of 
 
 116  Deportation is made criminal as a breach of the Geneva Conventions under 
article 2(g)—”unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a 
civilian”—and as a crime against humanity under article 5(d)—”deportation.”  Id. at 
art. 2(g).  
 117  Sirkin, supra note 10, at 500. 
 118  Final Rep. of the U.N. Comm’n of Experts Established Pursuant to S.C. Res. 
780 (1992), § III.B, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994), available at 
http://www.his.com/~twarrick/commxyu4.htm. 
 119  See Sirkin, supra note 10, at 489–91. 
 120  Id. at 502. 
 121  Id. at 500, 506. 
 122  Id. at 500 (“International courts and tribunals commonly criminalize ethnic 
cleansing under the crime of deportation or forcible transfer or the crime of 
persecution—both crimes against humanity.”). 
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genocide.123 
In its jurisprudence, the ICTY helped to resurrect what seemed 
to be the legally moribund concept of cultural genocide.124  The court 
essentially carved a niche for cultural genocide: the acts considered 
genocide were restricted to the five enumerated in the ICTY statute, 
but other physical and cultural acts and motivations not explicitly 
stated in the statute could be used to prove the specific intent behind 
genocide.125 
D. The International Criminal Court 
The 1990s thus saw a huge “dynamism” in, or development of, 
international criminal law due to the jurisprudence produced by the 
international criminal tribunals established to adjudicate the crimes 
committed during the wars in Yugoslavia and Rwanda.126  These 
events also led to a newfound recognition of a need to create a 
permanent international institution by which to prosecute 
perpetrators of international crimes—the creation of which had been 
stalled for the previous fifty years, despite numerous inclinations to 
act upon it.127  Finally doing so, the U.N. GA convened the Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, in Rome, Italy in June 1998.128 
Among other important issues, the Conference addressed 
whether the statute of this new court—called the Rome Statute—
would adopt verbatim the definition of genocide contained in the 
Genocide Convention or whether the definition would be expanded 
to incorporate the newly emerging jurisprudence and analysis from 
 
 123  Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment (Trial Chamber), ¶¶ 578–
79 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001); G.A. Res. 47/121, U.N. 
Doc. AG/RES/47/121 (Dec. 18, 1992).  GA resolutions are not law; they are only 
evidence of what the international community believes is law.  SHAW, supra note 71, at 
88.  The only way international tribunals may get around the strict parameters of 
their statutes is by finding, for example, that cultural genocide or ethnic cleansing 
has become criminalized under customary international law by showing widespread 
conformance of state practice and opinio juris, or belief by the states that it is law.  See 
generally id. at 76–89. 
 124  See supra Part II.C. 
 125  See generally Krstić (trial chamber judgment), at ¶¶ 574–80. 
 126  Schabas, supra note 97, at 162. 
 127  For example, in 1989, the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago suggested 
that the international illegal drug trade be dealt with by the establishment of a 
permanent international tribunal.  See SCHABAS, supra note 13, at 90. 
 128  Sonali B. Shah, The Oversight of the Last Great International Institution of the 
Twentieth Century: The International Criminal Court’s Definition of Genocide, 16 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 351, 372 (2002). 
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the criminal tribunals.129  Rather than engage in the same divisive 
debates over the expansion of the definition that had so plagued the 
committees drafting the Genocide Convention, the delegates 
“resist[ed] the temptation to add new categories” and decided to use 
the same language as in the Convention.130  Cuba was the only 
country to suggest incorporating new components into the 
definition, but its proposal received little support.131  Thus even 
though its motivation was strategic, the international community 
failed to capitalize on an auspicious opportunity to remedy the 
deficiencies in the definition, and prosecution, of genocide by 
including the concepts of cultural genocide and ethnic cleansing.  
The provisions for the punishment of genocide contained in the 
Rome Statute, which created the ICC, therefore, are identical to 
those contained in the Genocide Convention and the statute for the 
ICTY—excluding cultural genocide once again.132 
The Rome Statute does, however, take from the ICTY statute its 
provision on the illegality of the seizures of, and destruction or 
damage to, cultural institutions.133  It incorporates as a war crime, in 
the context of both an international and non-international armed 
conflict, attacking protected objects.134  Those objects are “buildings 
dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, 
[and] historical monuments.”135  In addition to this second-best 
option, the ICC will presumably adopt the principle of using cultural 
destruction as evidence of the specific intent necessary for genocide 
once it is confronted with a defendant charged with genocide.136  
Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir is currently the only person thus 
far that the ICC has indicted for genocide, but he remains at large.137 
 
 129  Id. at 376 n.136; Schabas, supra note 97, at 162. 
 130  Shah, supra note 128, at 377 (quoting Press Release, Preparatory Committee 
for Establishment of International Criminal Court Discusses Definitions of 
“Genocide,” “Crimes Against Humanity,” U.N. Press Release L/2762 (Mar. 26, 
1996)). 
 131  Schabas, supra note 97, at 162. 
 132  See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 6. 
 133  See id. at art. 8(2)(b)(ix), 8(2)(e)(iv).   
 134  Id. 
 135  Id.  The crime also includes “hospitals or places where the sick and wounded 
are collected.”  Id. 
 136  Within international law, there is no hierarchy of courts and so the ICC need 
not, but may if it so chooses, accept the rather well-established principle that attacks 
on, and destruction of, culture may substantiate a finding of specific intent.  See 
SHAW, supra note 71, at 123, 1116. 
 137  See, e.g., Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir in Malawi: ICC wants answers, BBC NEWS (Oct. 
20, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15384163. 
HON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:37 PM 
2013] COMMENT 381 
 
Despite a promising beginning for the criminalization of 
cultural genocide, incorporation of the concept has been withheld 
from international criminal conventions and statutes.138  It has made 
piecemeal appearances in international jurisprudence, but while its 
exclusion has been bemoaned by some, it has consistently been 
relegated to the sidelines.  Nevertheless, the ICC birthed a new 
theory of legal participation, allowing for victims of the crimes 
committed by ICC-accused to be represented before the court.139  
This radical mechanism has the potential to influence the way 
cultural destruction is treated in international criminal law.140  The 
ICC will soon face the task of analyzing its own interpretation of 
genocide during which time it will undoubtedly rely heavily on 
previous interpretations by the ICTY.141  Until then, or until the Rome 
Statute is amended by the states142 to include a separate provision for 
the prosecution of cultural genocide—a desirable event—there is 
another, more subtle way by which cultural considerations should be 
presented to the court: by the certification of both natural persons 
and cultural institutions as official victims of the various conflict 
situations under the purview of the ICC.  The ICC would be well 
served by letting the victims carve a niche for themselves by 
presenting to the court the cultural context of the conflicts and 
crimes. 
III. THE NOVEL APPROACH TO VICTIM PARTICIPATION 
The Rome Statute of the ICC contains a new and revolutionary 
provision that allows for victims to participate in a legal capacity—not 
merely as witnesses or recipients of reparations—throughout most 
stages of the accountability process, from the investigation stage 
through the trial itself.143  Neither the ICTY nor its sister tribunal set 
 
 138  See Genocide Convention, supra note 45; Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 
78; Rome Statute, supra note 24. 
 139  See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 68(3).  
 140  Gioia Greco, Victims’ Rights Overview Under the ICC Legal Framework: A 
Jurisprudential Analysis, 7 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 531, 533 (2007) (“[Victims’] involvement 
in trials and cooperation in the pursuit of criminal prosecution advanced . . . the 
application of international criminal law.”). 
 141  See Amal Alamuddin, Collection of Evidence, in PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 235–36 (Karim A.A. Khan et al. ed., 2010). 
 142  Amendments may be proposed by any state party to the Rome Statute.  Rome 
Statute, supra note 24, at art. 121 (“After the expiry of seven years from the entry into 
force of this Statute, any State Party may propose amendments thereto.”). 
 143  Id.; Miriam Cohen, Victims’ Participation Rights Within the International Criminal 
Court: A Critical Overview, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 351, 351 (2009). 
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up for Rwanda provide for a similar participatory-rights scheme.144  
One of the main justifications for this novel institution is that the 
overwhelming function of the ICC is truth-finding, and victims, 
having experienced first-hand the crimes at issue, are in a good 
position to help the ICC accomplish that mission.145  Granting victims 
a larger participatory role also ensures that the ICC will address their 
concerns—not only for accountability but also for justice (both 
communal and individual) and reconciliation.146  As with much at the 
ICC, one of the drawbacks of this scheme is that the jurisprudence 
assessing and analyzing the boundaries, scope, and modalities of 
victim participation is still developing and is therefore quite fluid (as 
well as vague and contradictory).147 
A. Modes of Participation 
The Rome Statute provides primarily for two avenues of 
participatory rights: (1) a very narrow and specific route based on 
Articles 15(3) and 19, which strictly delineates what role victims may 
play in initiating investigations and challenging jurisdiction and 
admissibility,148 respectively; and (2) a much broader, and therefore 
more ambiguous, route founded on Article 68(3), which allows 
victims to generally participate in “proceedings.”149 
1. Narrow Preliminary Rights 
Article 15 allows “victims [to] make representations to the Pre-
Trial Chamber” (PTC)150 when the prosecutor has decided that she 
 
 144  Cohen, supra note 143, at 352.  Some civil law systems, however, mainly in 
Europe, do allow for active participation by the victims.  Id. at 352 n.11. 
 145  Id. at 351, 353. 
 146  Id. at 353. 
 147  Id. 
 148  The concept of admissibility refers to whether the ICC may hear the case in 
the first place.  The court must decline cases that are “being investigated or 
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or 
unable genuinely to carry” it out; “the case has been investigated by a State which has 
jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person 
concerned;” “the person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the 
subject of the complaint;” and “the case is not of sufficient gravity.”  Rome Statute, 
supra note 24, at art. 17(1). 
 149   Cohen, supra note 143, at 353, 358, 360. 
 150  The court is composed of the presidency, the appeals division, the trial 
division and the pre-trial division, the office of the prosecutor, and the registry.  
Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 34.  The pre-trial chambers are tasked with, inter 
alia, evaluating the legal and evidentiary requirements—a “reasonable basis”—for 
initiating an investigation; taking preliminary steps to “ensure the efficiency and 
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has sufficient evidence to request an authorization of an investigation 
from the PTC.151  In that way, the victims may help to support the 
prosecutor’s case before the chamber, as the chamber makes a 
determination as to whether “there is a reasonable basis” that the case 
“fall[s] within the jurisdiction of the court” and that therefore an 
investigation into the alleged crimes would be substantiated.152  Aside 
from receiving authorization from the PTC, the prosecutor “may 
initiate investigations proprio motu153 on the basis of information” that 
may be provided by various victims’ organizations and non-
governmental organizations, thus “triggering” the investigation.154  
Direct victim participation may also put some pressure on the 
prosecutor to begin an investigation even if it is within the 
prosecutor’s discretion whether to proceed—or at least begin making 
preliminary inquiries.155  Having such roles is very important for the 
victims because they will be able to gain access to all public 
information about the conflict at issue from a very early stage in the 
proceedings, as well as be able to add to the accumulation of 
information, which will be to the benefit of the prosecutor.156 
Article 19 allows for victims who have already engaged with the 
court in some legal capacity to raise questions of jurisdiction or 
admissibility to the PTC.157  There are two principal restrictions to this 
right of participation.  The first is that it is only available to those 
victims who have “already communicated with the Court in relation 
to the case,” thereby precluding new participants.158  The second is 
that it can only be exercised within a case, and not merely a 
situation.159  This distinction between a situation and a case—
 
integrity of the proceedings” and “protect the rights of the defence [sic];” issuing 
warrants and summonses; protecting the privacy and security of victims and 
witnesses, preserving evidence, protecting those arrested, and protecting national 
security information.  Id. at art. 53, 56–58. 
 151  Id. at art. 15(3). 
 152  Id. at art. 15(4). 
 153  Of one’s own accord.  Ex Proprio Motu, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (9th ed. 
2009). 
 154  Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 15(1); Elisabeth Baumgartner, Aspects of 
Victim Participation in the Proceedings of the International Criminal Court, 90 INT’L REV. OF 
THE RED CROSS 870, 427 (2008). 
 155  Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 427. 
 156  Cohen, supra note 143, at 358. 
 157  Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 19(3); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of 
the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/1/3, Sept. 3–10 2002, Rule 59 
[hereinafter Rules of Procedure and Evidence]. 
 158  Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 157, at rule 59. 
 159   Cohen, supra note 143, at 361. 
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extrapolated from the structure of the Rome Statute—is very 
important, as it features heavily in the nature of proceedings at the 
ICC and often determines the extent of victim participation at a 
particular stage of a trial.160  The difference between a “situation” and 
a “case” is that a situation is defined by “temporal, territorial and 
personal parameters” and is the proceeding by which a 
determination is made as to “whether the facts alleged should give 
rise to a criminal investigation.”161  More colloquially, it is the 
investigation into an event, incident, or spate of violence during 
which time the prosecutor determines who, if anyone, bears 
responsibility for international criminal law violations.162  The end 
result is the filing of a request for a warrant of arrest (or summons to 
appear) with a pre-trial chamber charging the alleged perpetrators 
with crimes under the Rome Statute.163  A case, on the other hand, 
refers to the adjudication of “specific incidents . . . among the crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court”164 “with one or more specific 
suspects occurring within a situation under investigation,”165 which 
follows “the issuance of an arrest warrant or a summons to appear.”166  
In essence, a case encompasses the full spectrum of a trial of an 
accused, from indictment to final judgment on the merits. 
2. Broad Rights in a Situation and Case 
The broader rights that victims have under the Rome Statute, 
while seemingly explicit, are much less straightforward and are 
therefore more open to interpretation.167  There are more 
requirements for participation and distinctions exist between who 
qualifies to participate in a situation and a case.168  But the modes of 
participation are much greater once these qualifications are met, 
 
 160  Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 414; see, e.g., Prosecution’s Reply under Rule 
89(1) to the Application for Participation of Applicants a/0106/06 to a/0110/06, 
a/0128/06 to a/0162/06, a/0188/06, a/0199/06, a/0203/06, a/0209/06, 
a/0214/06, a/0220/06 to a/0222/06 and a/0224/06 to a/0250/06 (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I), No. ICC-01/04-346 (June 25, 2007) (the Prosecutor makes a distinction 
between “situation victims” and “case victims”). 
 161  Greco, supra note 140, at 537 n.30. 
 162  Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 414. 
 163  Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 58. 
 164  Greco, supra note 140, at 537 n.31. 
 165  Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 414. 
 166  Greco, supra note 140, at 537 n.31. 
 167  See Cohen, supra note 143, at 365–65. 
 168  See generally Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 68(3); Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, supra note 157, at Rule 85. 
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increasing the role that victims may play. 
a.  Statutory Criteria for Participation 
Article 68(3), along with Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, provide the participatory framework by which the legal 
rights of victims are granted for the various proceedings within a 
situation and a case.169  It is this portion of the victim participation 
mechanism that is the most fluid, as the pre-trial chambers struggle to 
articulate a coherent set of standards and tests for admitting qualified 
victims and delineating their modes of participation.  In its first 
decision regarding victim participation, PTC I relied on the strict 
language of Rule 85(a) to enumerate the four requirements a victim 
must satisfy to gain the legal right to participate: the victim must be 
(1) a natural person; (2) who has suffered harm; (3) resulting from a 
crime under the jurisdiction of the court; and (4) there must be a 
causal link between the alleged crime and the harm.170 
Subsequent decisions by the pre-trial chambers and the appeals 
chamber have provided more specific guidelines for these criteria.171  
With regard to the first criterion, Single Judge Kuenyehia of PTC I, 
overseeing the Darfur situation, determined that a deceased person is 
not a “natural person” within the meaning of Rule 85.172  Therefore, 
victims may only file on behalf of themselves as natural persons, as 
well as on behalf of minors, the disabled, and any individual who has 
given his or her consent, as in a situation where the person is still in a 
conflict zone and is unable to file on his or her own behalf.173  
Regarding the second criterion, the harm suffered by the person 
seeking victim status may be material or economic, physical, and/or 
 
 169  Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 68(3); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
supra note 157, at Rule 85. 
 170   Decision on the Applications for the Participation of the Proceedings of VPRS 
1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber I), ¶ 79, No. 
ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr (Jan. 17, 2006); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra 
note 157, at Rule 85(a); Cohen, supra note 143, at 367. 
 171   See generally Cohen, supra note 143, at 366–70. 
 172   Corrigendum to Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
Proceedings of Applicants a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to 
a/0033/07 and a/0035/07 to a/0038/07 (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Single Judge) ¶ 36, 
No. ICC-02/05-111-Corr (Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Corrigendum to Decision on 
Applicants 2007]; Cohen, supra note 143, at 368.   
 173  See generally Standard Application Form to Participate in Proceedings Before 
the International Criminal Court for Individual Victims and Persons Acting on Their 
Behalf [hereinafter Old Application Form]; Application Form for Individuals: 
Request for Participation in Proceedings and Reparations at the ICC for Individual 
Victims [hereinafter New Application Form]. 
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emotional or psychological.174  So long as the individual suffered 
personally, he or she qualifies, regardless of whether the suffering was 
direct or indirect.175 
The criteria necessary to qualify as an institutional victim under 
Rule 85(b) are virtually identical to those required for individuals, 
save that the victim must be an organization or institution, the 
property of which is “dedicated to religion, education, art or science 
or charitable purposes,” or is a “historic monument . . . , hospital . . . 
or other place . . . and object . . . for humanitarian purposes.”176  The 
only difference—and it is a significant one—is that with  regard to the 
harm criterion, an institution or organization must suffer direct harm; 
the institution or organization cannot become a victim through 
indirect harm.177  In addition, the person filing on behalf of such an 
institution or organization must submit documents sufficient to 
establish locus standi (standing) to act on that institution’s behalf.178  
The court will consider any document in accordance with the 
domestic law of the country in question for proof of the legal status of 
the institution and proof of the applicant’s own standing within the 
institution when determining whether to allow the individual to file 
on its behalf.179  Thus the requirements for obtaining victim status as 
an institution or organization are slightly more onerous than those 
for an individual, given that the harm suffered by the property must 
be direct and that the person who is filing on its behalf must legally 
be permitted to do so under the laws of his or her own country.180 
 
 174  Corrigendum to Decision on Applicants 2007, at ¶¶ 30, 38–50; Judgment on the 
appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defense against Trial Chamber I’s Decision on 
Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008 (Appeals Chamber), ¶ 1, No. ICC-01/04-
01/06-1432, July 11, 2008 [hereinafter Judgment on the Appeals 2008]. 
 175  Judgment on the Appeals 2008, at ¶¶ 38–39.  The distinction between direct and 
indirect harm comes into play when “harm suffered by one victim as a result of the 
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court . . . give[s] rise to harm 
suffered by other victims.”  Id. at ¶ 32.  The court gives the example of the child 
soldier: the child suffers directly and his parents suffer indirectly; both would qualify 
as victims in the ICC (so long as they met the other requirements).  Id. 
 176  Corrigendum to the Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in 
Connection with the Investigation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Pre-
Trial Chamber I, Single Judge), No. ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG, ¶ 140 (Jan. 31, 2008) 
[hereinafter Corrigendum to Investigation in DRC]; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
supra note 157, at Rule 85(b). 
 177  Corrigendum to Investigation in DRC, at ¶ 141; Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
supra note 157, at Rule 85(b). 
 178   Corrigendum to Investigation in DRC, at ¶142. 
 179   Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation (Pre-Trial Chamber III, Single 
Judge), ¶ 53, No. ICC-01/05-01/08-320 (Dec. 12, 2008). 
 180   See id. 
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The provision allowing for institutions and organizations to 
qualify as victims in order to be legally represented before the court is 
heavily under-utilized.181  What is particularly curious and useful 
about the definition of qualified institutions is that the language 
mirrors, almost precisely, that contained in the article on the war 
crime of attacking protected objects.182  Thus, there is enormous 
potential for a wide array of cultural institutions to be able to 
promote their interests before the court—not just for reparations183 
but also with regard to their purposeful destruction.  To date, 
however, only two institutions have availed themselves of this 
mechanism.  In the first, a headmaster filed on behalf of his 
destroyed school, in the situation of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo.184  His application was granted, as the court determined that 
his application met all of the Rule 85(b) requirements and was 
properly substantiated by legal documents showing standing.185  In 
the second, a priest filed on behalf of his destroyed church, in the 
Bemba case in the Central African Republic situation.186  His 
application was denied because he had filled out the application 
form incorrectly—he had filed on behalf of himself and the 
institution on the same form—and he had also failed to provide 
sufficient documentation of his legal standing.187 
Aside from meeting the objective criteria of a victim, there is one 
final requirement that both a human victim and an institutional 
victim must meet.188  In order to participate in proceedings, the 
“personal interests” of that victim must be affected.189  The 
interpretation of this phrase has caused some controversy.190  The ICC 
 
 181   Only two institutions have thus far filed for status.  See generally THE OFFICE OF 
THE PUBLIC COUNSEL FOR VICTIMS, REPRESENTING VICTIMS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: A MANUAL FOR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES 50 (2011) [hereinafter OPCV 
MANUAL]. 
 182   See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 8(b)(2)(ix); Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, supra note 157, at Rule 85(b). 
 183   This Comment will not address the question of reparations. 
 184  OPCV MANUAL, supra note 181, at 50. 
 185  See Corrigendum to the Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in 
Connection with the Investigation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Pre-
Trial Chamber I, Single Judge), ¶ 139–143, No. ICC-01/04-423-Corr-tENG (Jan. 31, 
2008). 
 186   OPCV MANUAL, supra note 181, at 50. 
 187   See Fourth Decision on Victims’ Participation (Pre-Trial Chamber III, Single 
Judge), ¶ 53–56, No. ICC-01/05-01/08-320 (Dec. 12, 2008). 
 188  Cohen, supra note 143, at 368. 
 189  Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 157, at Rule 68(3). 
 190  Compare Décision sur les demandes de participation à la procédure de VPRS1, 
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chambers have interpreted it to require a reassessment of personal 
interest for every new proceeding in which a victim wishes to 
participate; this is separate and distinct from “the entire 
proceedings,” or the trial itself.191  Accordingly, in some types of 
proceedings—largely procedural—victims’ requests to participate will 
be denied because the personal interests will be too tenuous.192  
Recent jurisprudence has in fact established that, contrary to previous 
decisions by the three pre-trial chambers, a victim does not have a 
general procedural status of victim in the situation or investigation 
phase.193  This, however, does not preclude victims from petitioning 
to participate in each individual proceeding taking place within the 
investigative phase.194  But it does require them to restate their 
personal interests in the specific proceeding in which they would like 
to participate; once they qualify, the victims are not automatically 
allowed to participate in every proceeding brought before the 
chamber in the situation.195 
Participation in a case, on the other hand, is not so rigid.  Once 
the prosecutor files charges, the chamber reassesses the victims who 
have already been accepted into the situation phase to determine 
whether they fulfill the additional requirement for participation in a 
case.196  There must be a “sufficient causal link between the harm they 
have suffered and the crimes for which there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that [the accused] bears criminal responsibility.”197  For new 
applications, the prospective victim must meet all of the objective 
criteria from Rule 85(a) or (b), allege sufficient personal interest, 
and establish a sufficient causal link between the harm and the 
 
VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 et VPRS 6 (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-01/04-
101-tEN-Corr (Jan. 17, 2006), with Decision on Victims’ Participation in Proceedings 
Relating to the Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I), No. ICC-01/04-593 (Apr. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Decision on Victims’ 
Participation in DRC]. 
 191  Cohen, supra note 143, at 368. 
 192  Id. 
 193  See Decision on Victims’ Participation in Proceedings Related to the Situation 
in the Republic of Kenya (Pre-Trial Chamber II), No. ICC-01/09-24, 3 November 
2010 [hereinafter Decision on Victims’ Participation in Kenya]; Decision on Victims’ 
Participation in DRC. 
 194  Decision on Victims’ Participation in DRC, at ¶ 9 (emphasis added). 
 195  See generally Decision on Victims’ Participation in Kenya, supra note 193. 
 196  Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings Submitted 
by VPRS 1 to VPRS 6 in the Case of Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I), No. ICC-01/04-01/06-172-tEN, at pg. 6/9 (June 29, 2006). 
 197  Id. 
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crimes for which the accused was indicted.198  Once a person has been 
granted victim status in a case, that status is permanent for the entire 
duration of the trial, as the trial itself is considered a proceeding.199  
The person need not resubmit a reassessment of personal interest for 
each phase or proceeding within the trial. 
b. Participatory Rights 
In addition to the more restricted right to participate in the 
prosecution process such as in initiating investigations and 
challenging jurisdiction and admissibility, there are various other 
ways and other proceedings by which victims may participate.200  One 
such proceeding is the confirmation of charges hearing.201  Once the 
accused is brought before the court, the charges against him must be 
confirmed so that the trial may begin.202  In Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga,203 the first before the ICC, the victims’ legal representatives 
were allowed to give opening and closing statements, although they 
were limited to making only legal observations and not presenting 
facts or personal statements.204  The same four Lubanga victims who 
participated in the confirmation of charges hearing were, during the 
actual trial phase, “allowed to present their view in written and oral 
form with regard to all the procedural and substantive issues that 
arose.”205 
 
 198  See generally id. 
 199   Judgment on victim participation in the investigation stage of the 
proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the decision of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in the appeals of the OPCD and the Prosecutor 
against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 24 December 2007, No. ICC-01/04-
556, ¶ 45 (Dec. 19, 2008), (a “proceeding” is “a term denoting a judicial cause 
pending before a Chamber.”). 
 200   See Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 425–30. 
 201  Id. at 428. 
 202  Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 61. 
 203  Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was the alleged commander-in-chief of the UPC and 
FPLC militia forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo, from September 2002 
until at least the end of 2003.  Democratic Republic of Congo—ICC-01/04-01/06, The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0104/Related
+Cases/ICC+0104+0106/Democratic+Republic+of+the+Congo.htm (last visited Jan. 
20, 2012).  He is charged with the war crimes of “enlisting and conscripting of 
children under the age of 15 into the [FPLC] and using them to participate actively 
in hostilities” in an international armed conflict and non-international armed 
conflict.  Id. 
 204  Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 429. 
 205  Id.  
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One of the principal decisions206 handed down on victim 
participation also stated that victims may present and examine 
evidence; ask appropriate questions whenever the evidence presented 
affects their personal interests; access all public (and therefore 
redacted) information presented by the prosecution and defense; 
and “participate in closed and ex parte hearings depending on the 
circumstances.”207  For those victims who also have legal 
representation—whether individual or common, court-appointed or 
chosen—their participatory rights can extend past procedural rights 
and include the “questioning of witnesses, experts or the accused.”208 
Nevertheless, to some extent, victim participation is at the 
discretion of the court, which must decide whether such participation 
is appropriate.209  A determination of appropriateness must balance 
the rights of the accused, including the “right to a fair and 
expeditious trial,” with the rights of the victims to present their views 
and concerns when their personal interests are affected.210  The court 
must also make sure that the burden of proof remains with the 
prosecutor so that the victims do not become like a second 
prosecutor.211  As such, victims should refrain from making factual 
accusations or independent legal conjectures about the evidence that 
would disturb the prosecution’s case or inhibit the accused’s 
defense.212 
Still, even within what would seem to be a rather limited or 
restricted manner of participation by qualified victims, there is a 
great deal of potential to influence the outcome of a proceeding.  An 
astute victim legal team would particularly tailor its representation to 
highlight the weaker portions of the prosecutor’s case, buttress the 
prosecutor’s evidence with strong witnesses and evidence of its own, 
and, depending on the charges, paint for the court a more nuanced 
cultural landscape than the prosecution might need to.  The success 
of this mechanism for victim participation—and apparent 
 
 206  Decision on Victims’ Participation (Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-01/04-01/06-
1119 (Jan. 18, 2008). 
 207  Id. at ¶¶ 108, 110, 113; Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 429–30. 
 208  Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 430. 
 209  “The Court shall permit [participation by the victims] at stages of the 
proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is 
not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial.”  Rome Statute, supra note 24, at Art. 68(3). 
 210  Cohen, supra note 143, at 371. 
 211  Id. 
 212  Id. at 373. 
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recognition of the myriad benefits it brings—is evidenced by the 
onslaught of victim applications that swamped the Victims 
Participation and Reparations Section (VPRS) during the brief 
window that the court had set in anticipation of the confirmation of 
charges hearing of Callixte Mbarushimana.213  VPRS strongly 
requested an extension so that it might process the 783 applications it 
had received, of which 530 seemed to be complete.214 
The victim participation framework is a new mechanism in the 
accountability process at the ICC, but its innovative features have 
proved appealing to the international community and many victims 
have applied for victim status in order to avail themselves of the 
benefits.215  The potential to influence and enhance the trial process 
is enormous for victims and their legal representatives.  Specifically, 
there are many opportunities during the proceedings to inject into 
the process a different, more culture-oriented perspective. 
Cultural genocide has been somewhat sidelined as a distinct 
legal concept, even as it has been acknowledged as one way to prove 
genocidal intent.216  It has, however, a more versatile use in 
highlighting the cultural background against which conflicts can be 
analyzed; victim participation at the ICC can help to strengthen this 
cultural context.  It is important to note that victim participation is 
not a way to get the crime of cultural genocide back into the Rome 
 
 213  First transmission to the Pre-Trial Chamber of applications to participate in 
the proceedings (Pre-Trial Chamber I, Single Judge), No. ICC-01/04-01/10-166, at 
pg. 3/6, 4/6 (May 20, 2011) [hereinafter First transmission to participate].  
Mbarushimana was the “alleged executive secretary of the . . . FDLR-FCA,” a 
Rwandan rebel group participating in the conflict in the DRC.  Democratic Republic of 
the Congo—ICC-01/04-01/10, the Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, INT’L CRIM. 
COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations 
/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc01040110/icc01040110?lan=en-GB 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2012).  He was charged with the crimes against humanity of 
murder, torture, rape, inhuman acts, and persecution; and the war crimes of attacks 
against the civilian population, murder, mutilation, torture, rape, inhuman 
treatment, destruction of property, and pillaging.  Id. 
 214  First transmission to participate, at pg. 3/6.  The request was denied.  Id. at pg. 
5/6.  On December 16, 2011, the PTC I declined to confirm the charges against 
Mbarushimana and declared his release from ICC custody upon completion of the 
necessary arrangements.  Decision on the confirmation of charges (Pre-Trial 
Chamber I) pg. 149/150, No. ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red (Dec. 16, 2011). 
 215  REGISTRY AND TRUST FUND FOR VICTIMS FACT SHEET, MARCH 2011, COALITION 
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1, available at 
www.coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/Victims_Factsheet_March_2011.18apr1832.p
df (“Since 2005, the [VPRS] has received a total of 4773 victims’ applications for 
participation and 2031 for reparation” as of March 31, 2011). 
 216  See supra Part II.C.1. 
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Statute in its own right.  Cultural genocide is substantive law which is 
not presently contained in the Rome Statute; the victim participation 
mechanism is one procedure that can significantly affect the ICC’s 
interpretation of genocide by infusing culture into the cases.  As 
such, victim participation can be an extremely useful instrument in 
expressing the foundation of the concept that culture is an 
undeniable and intertwined part of all proceedings by reminding the 
court of past attacks on cultural life, buildings, and artifacts, and the 
continuing decimating effects such acts are having on local culture 
and identity.217 
In this sense, participation by both natural persons and 
institutions or organizations will allow for slightly different 
perspectives to be advanced and will reinforce different aspects of a 
nation’s or group’s culture.  The legal representatives of the victims 
would be well-advised to take advantage of their unique position 
within the trial proceedings to advance the charge for recognition of 
cultural destruction as a legitimate consequence and oft-desired 
result of attacks on individuals, villages, and communities.  In the 
absence of any provisions on cultural genocide or ethnic cleansing in 
the Rome Statute—which would require that this type of evidence be 
presented—the victims’ legal representatives would be able to 
supplement the prosecutor’s case for other crimes218 and heighten 
awareness of the cultural context in which the events at issue 
occurred. 
IV. APPLICATION TO THE CASE AGAINST SUDANESE PRESIDENT OMAR 
AL-BASHIR 
The victim participation framework, while still fluid, was tested 
and tried in the first-ever case before the ICC, Prosecutor v. Lubanga.219  
Submitted for deliberation in August 2011, Trial Chamber I issued 
the ICC’s first-ever verdict in March 2012, finding Lubanga guilty of 
“the war crimes of conscripting and enlisting children under the age 
of 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities.”220  This 
 
 217  See, e.g., Air strikes and clashes continue in Darfur, RADIO DABANGA (Dec. 27, 
2011), http://www.radiodabanga.org/node/22943. 
 218   It is important to note that the prosecutor cannot charge an accused with 
cultural genocide because it is not contained in the Rome Statute.  See generally Rome 
Statute, supra note 24.  She must therefore be careful about how to color her 
genocide allegations—cultural harms can only be used to fortify her case as proof of 
intent.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
 219   Greco, supra note 140, at 546. 
 220   Press Release, Trial Chamber I to Deliberate on the Case Against Thomas 
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Comment does not analyze the Lubanga victims’ participation and 
instead focuses on the case against Sudanese President al-Bashir 
because al-Bashir is the only person so far to have been indicted for 
genocide, the crime most sensitive to cultural considerations—and 
the reason why the al-Bashir case is so significant.221 
A. Charging Bashir with Genocide 
The pre-trial chamber denied the prosecutor’s original request 
for an arrest warrant for al-Bashir222 on charges of genocide—by 
killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm, and deliberately 
inflicting destructive conditions of life223—on the grounds that, 
despite the drawing of various inferences from the presentation of 
evidence by the prosecutor, a conclusion of genocidal intent by al-
Bashir could not be the only reasonable conclusion drawn.224  The 
chamber reasoned that since there were other plausible 
conclusions—for example, discrimination or persecution—there was 
 
Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-CPI-20110826-PR714 (Aug. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Media/Press+Releases/ (page 2, 
“26.08.2011”); Press Release, ICC First verdict: Thomas Lubanga guilty of 
conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 and using them to 
participate in hostilities, ICC-CPI-20120314-PR776 (Mar. 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/A70A5D27-18B4-4294-816F-BE68155242E0.htm. 
 221  Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest 
(Pre-Trial Chamber I), ¶¶ 23–24, 30–31, 39–40, 43, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-94 (July 12, 
2010) [hereinafter Second Decision on Arrest Warrant].  
 222  Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir is the President of the Republic of Sudan; he 
has been in power since 1993.  Darfur, Sudan—ICC-02/05-01/09, The Prosecutor v. 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, INT’L CRIM. COURT, 
http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%
20icc%200205/related%20cases/icc02050109/icc02050109?lan=en-GB (last visited 
Jan. 20, 2012).  He is alleged to be at the head of a Government of Sudan counter-
insurgency campaign “to unlawfully attack . . . the [Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa] 
civilian population of Darfur” as part of the conflict against the SLM/A, JEM, and 
other militia groups, which are composed of members of those tribes.  Warrant of 
Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, No. ICC-02/05-01/09-1 at pg. 5/8, (March 
4, 2009).  As such, he is charged with the crimes against humanity of murder, 
extermination, forcible transfer, torture, and rape; the war crimes of intentionally 
directing attacks against a civilian population as such or against individual civilians 
not taking part in hostilities, and pillaging; and genocide by killing, by causing 
serious bodily or mental harm, and by deliberately inflicting on each target group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about the group’s physical destruction.  Id. at 
pg. 7/8, 8/8; Second Decision on Arrest Warrant, at pg. 28/30. 
 223  Rome Statute, supra note 24, at articles 6(a)–(c). 
 224  Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), ¶¶ 159, 205, No. ICC-02/05-
01/09-3, Mar. 4, 2009 [hereinafter First Decision on Arrest Warrant].   
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no specific intent to commit genocide.225 
The prosecutor appealed the PTC’s decision not to issue an 
arrest warrant on charges of genocide—though the chamber did 
issue one for various war crimes and crimes against humanity.226  The 
appeals chamber determined that the PTC had applied the incorrect 
standard for determining genocidal intent—at least for the arrest 
warrant stage—and that the proper standard is that only one of the 
reasonable conclusions derived from the evidence presented need be 
genocidal intent.227  Upon remand, the PTC determined that the 
inferences from the evidence did lead to a reasonable potential 
conclusion of genocidal intent and issued a second warrant of arrest 
for al-Bashir for charges of genocide by killing, causing serious bodily 
or mental harm, and deliberately inflicting conditions of life 
calculated to bring about physical destruction.228 
In its analysis of genocide and the intent necessary to warrant 
charges, the PTC made a distinction between genocidal intent and 
what it called persecutory intent—or the intent to “discriminate on 
political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other 
grounds.”229  Both require dolus specialis, or specific intent, but the 
objectives of the intention behind the targeting are different.230  One 
is the intent to destroy in whole or in part; the other is intent to 
discriminate.231  Such a distinction is highlighted in an analysis of the 
 
 225  Id. at ¶ 167. 
 226  Id. at pg. 92/95; Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the “Decision 
on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir,” (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-12 (Mar. 13, 2009) 
[hereinafter Prosecutor’s Appeal of Arrest Warrant]. 
 227  Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the “Decision on the 
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir” (Appeals Chamber), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-73, ¶¶ 30, 39 (Feb. 3, 2010) 
[hereinafter Judgment on Appeal of Arrest Warrant] (emphasis added). There is a multi-
tiered approach within the Rome Statue for the burden of proof to be met by the 
prosecutor during various stages of the trial: for the issuance of an arrest warrant, 
“reasonable grounds to believe” suffices.  Id. at ¶ 30.  This is heightened to 
“substantial grounds to believe” for the confirmation of charges hearing.  Id.; Rome 
Statute, supra note 24, at art. 61(7).  The final threshold to be met for conviction is 
“beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Judgment on Appeal of Arrest Warrant, at ¶ 30; Rome 
Statute, supra note 24, at art. 66(3). 
 228   Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest 
(Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-94, ¶¶ 4–5 (July 12, 2010); Second 
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. 
ICC-02/05-01/09-95, at pg. 8/9 (July 12, 2010). 
 229  First Decision on Arrest Warrant, supra note 224 at ¶ 141.   
 230  Id. 
 231  Id. 
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policies of ethnic cleansing.232  Ethnic cleansing does not necessarily 
result in the destruction of a people; genocide is not the “automatic 
consequence” of forcible displacement policies.233  As noted above, 
ethnic cleansing by itself is not considered a genocidal policy; it can 
only be considered as evidence of genocidal intent.234  “Genocide, 
[however], is an extreme and most inhuman form of persecution” 
and ethnic cleansing.235  This means that it may be the case that a 
policy of ethnic cleansing or persecution escalates into genocide; if 
the objective elements are met along with the specific intent, such 
policies may reach the level of prosecutable genocide.236 
Al-Bashir is not charged with persecution,237 a crime against 
humanity, but elements of what would be evidence of persecution 
may be used as evidence of genocide and genocidal intent because 
the difference is one of degree.238  That does not mean, however, that 
such evidence would be sufficient on its own.239  On the contrary, it 
would need to be accompanied by direct or indirect evidence of, for 
example: (1) a strategy to “deny and conceal the crimes” being 
committed against the targeted groups; (2) official statements and 
documents referencing or providing inferences of a genocidal policy, 
whether already in existence or in formation; and (3) “the nature 
and extent of the acts of violence” being committed.240  Proving al-
Bashir’s specific intent to commit genocide, required for a conviction 
of genocide, will be extremely difficult for the prosecutor, as was 
evidenced by the PTC’s initial rejection of the prosecutor’s request 
for an arrest warrant on charges of genocide—despite its initial 
application of the incorrect standard.241 
In its impugned first decision on the application for the arrest 
 
 232  Sirkin, supra note 10, at 505–09. 
 233  Id. at ¶ 144 (quoting Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & 
Montenegro) 2007 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 190  (Feb. 26) [hereinafter ICJ Judgment on Genocide]. 
 234  See supra Part II.C.2. 
 235  Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 142 
(Mar. 4, 2009) (quoting ICJ Judgment on Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. 7 at ¶ 188). 
 236  Id. at ¶¶ 142, 145. 
 237  See id. 
 238  Id. at ¶¶ 142–43. 
 239  Id. at ¶ 145. 
 240  Id. at ¶ 164. 
 241  See Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶¶ 
159, 205 (Mar. 4, 2009). 
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warrant, the PTC pointed to the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 
Decision on Genocide that analyzed whether genocide had been 
committed anywhere else outside of Srebrenica during the Yugoslav 
wars.242  The ICJ found that despite 
the mass killings of tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslim 
civilians and prisoners of war; the mass rapes of tens of 
thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilian women; the 
deportation and forcible displacement of hundreds of 
thousands of Bosnian Muslim civilians; the widespread and 
systematic beatings, torture and inhumane treatment 
(malnutrition and poor health conditions) in dozens of 
detention camps throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina; the 
siege of Bosnian Muslim civilians in cities through Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, such as Sarajevo, where shelling, sniping 
and starvation by hindering humanitarian aid was a matter 
of course; and the destruction of cultural, religious and historical 
property in an attempt to wipe out traces of the existence of the 
Bosnian-Muslim group from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
such evidence was insufficient to support an inference of genocidal 
intent by Bosnian-Serb leadership.243  The chamber then compared 
the evidence that had been presented to the ICJ in the Bosnia 
genocide case with that which had been presented to the ICC 
chamber in the Bashir genocide case, namely that the Government of 
Sudan forces had 
carried out numerous unlawful attacks, followed by 
systematic acts of pillage, on towns and villages, mainly 
inhabited by civilians belonging to the Fur, Masalit and 
Zaghawa groups; subjected thousands of civilians, belonging 
primarily to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups to acts of 
murder, as well as acts of extermination; subjected 
thousands of  civilian women, belonging primarily to the 
said groups to acts of rape; subjected hundreds of 
thousands of civilians belonging primarily to the said 
groups to acts of forcible transfer; and subjected civilians 
belonging primarily to the said groups to acts of torture, 
and found that while such evidence strongly supported a finding of 
serious war crimes and crimes against humanity, it could not be 
extended to a finding of the commission of genocide (or a finding of 
the specific intent for genocide).244 
 
 242  Id. at ¶ 194. 
 243  Id. at ¶ 194 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 244  Id. at ¶¶ 192–93. 
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Of the evidence presented by the prosecutor to show genocidal 
intent, the only reference to any kind of cultural destruction was the 
“unlawful arrest of community leaders and [their] subsequent 
mistreatment/torture” at the hands of the former members of the 
Sudanese secret police.245  Since the prosecutor will be fighting an 
increasingly uphill battle in proving genocide as the trial process 
proceeds, she should use every possible method to bolster his case for 
showing specific intent.  This includes evidence of ethnic cleansing, 
persecution, and cultural destruction. 
B. Using Culture to Prove the Specific Intent of Genocide in Darfur 
The insertion of a cultural perspective into the future 
proceedings of the case against Sudanese President al-Bashir is not 
only going to be a useful exercise, but also an imperative one.  The 
media has been hesitant to call the violence occurring in Darfur, 
raging since 2003, a genocide.246  The first high-profile political actor 
to brand Darfur a genocide was then-U.S. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell in 2004, who presented to the United Nations and to the U.S. 
Congress the findings of a U.S. Department of State report.247  
Powell’s testimony was immediately followed by an official statement 
from former President George W. Bush.248  In fact, most countries 
and organizations have shied away from labeling the atrocities a 
genocide, sticking instead to the lesser designation of crimes against 
humanity.249  The United States, as well, later backpedaled on its 
statements.250 
 
 245  Id. at ¶ 178. 
 246  See generally HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supra note 12, at 79–93. 
 247  The Crisis in Darfur: Hearing Before the Sen. Foreign Relations Comm., supra note 11 
(“When we reviewed the evidence . . . we concluded, I concluded, that genocide has 
been committed in Darfur and that the Government of Sudan and the Jingaweit bear 
responsibility—and that genocide may still be occurring. . . .”). 
 248  HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supra note 12, at 80 (“As a result of [Secretary 
Powell’s team of investigators] we have concluded that genocide has taken place in 
Darfur.  We urge the international community to work with us to prevent and 
suppress acts of genocide.  We call on the United Nations to undertake a full 
investigation of the genocide and other crimes in Darfur.”) (quoting Office of the 
Press Secretary, President’s Statement on Violence in Darfur, Sudan, Sept. 9, 2004, 
available at  http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2004/09 
/20040909-10.html). 
 249  Mai-Linh K. Hong, Note, A Genocide by Any Other Name: Language, Law, and the 
Response to Darfur, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 235, 237–38 (2008). 
 250  See HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supra note 12, at 85–93. 
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1.  The Specter of the Holocaust 
The main reason for such an aversion to the use of the term is 
the fact that the inspiration behind the Genocide Convention—and 
the clearest, most unequivocal example of genocide to date—was the 
Holocaust; the “genocides” occurring in today’s world do not and will 
not look anything like the Holocaust.251  Thus because Darfur does 
not look and feel like Europe in the 1940s, it cannot actually be a 
true or real genocide.252  Such a comparison is absurd and counter-
productive—how many people must die, in what manner, and with 
how much governmental documentation before the world calls it 
genocide?  One of the legacies of the Holocaust was the thousands of 
laws, orders, and documents (including diary entries)253 that 
systematically and in great detail illustrated the evolution of the 
Nazis’ “gigantic scheme to change, in favor of Germany, the balance 
of biological forces between it and the captive nations for many years 
to come.”254  The Nuremberg Tribunal used this evidence to conclude 
that the crime against humanity with which the first set of defendants 
was charged—and under which genocide was subsumed—”ha[d] 
been proved in the greatest detail.”255 
It is true that in Darfur, there is no “absolutely clear, well-
documented intent to destroy.”256  There are “[n]o public 
 
 251  See Hong, supra note 249, at 261. 
 252  “If this is a genocide, it doesn’t look very much like those we’ve known 
before.”  Scott Anderson, How Did Darfur Happen?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2004, § 6 
(Magazine) at 52, 56, available at 
http://nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magainze/17DARFUR.html. 
 253  SCHABAS, supra note 13, at 39 (Hans Frank testified before the Nuremberg 
Tribunal in his own defense and said, “[W]e have allowed ourselves to make 
utterances and my own diary has become a witness against me in this 
connection. . . .”). 
 254  LEMKIN, supra note 3, at xi.  Lemkin’s book contains hundreds of pages of 
painstakingly analyzed and transcribed laws, orders, decrees, acts, proclamations, and 
instructions that underpinned the Nazi policies.  See id. at xvii–xxxviii [Contents]. 
 255  France et al. v. Goering et al., 22 IMT 203, 408 (1946).  There were twenty-
three defendants, among whom perhaps the most infamous was Hermann Wilhelm 
Goering.  OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS 
CRIMINALITY, 1 NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION III (1946).  Some of the documents 
relied on by the Tribunal included “the personal and official correspondence of 
Alfred Rosenberg, together with a great quantity of Nazi Party correspondence;” 
“thirty-nine leather-bound volumes containing detailed inventories of the art 
treasures of Europe that had been looted;” “485 tons of crated papers [which 
contained] the records of the German Foreign Office from 1837 to 1944;” and over 
“300 crates of German High Command files, 85 notebooks containing minutes from 
Hitler’s conferences, and the complete files of the German Navy.”  Id. at vi. 
 256  Hong, supra note 249, at 262. 
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proclamations about ‘the enemy within,’ no extermination lists.”257  
“Instead, it is shadowy, informal; the killing takes place offstage.  It is 
the destruction of a people in a place where it is virtually impossible 
to distinguish incompetence from conspiracy.  Is that by design, the 
sheer evil genius of it all, or just more evidence of a government’s 
utter haplessness?”258  Thus, the fundamental question is whether 
there can be genocide where “there has never been a stable, 
technocratic regime or a bureaucracy to plan, execute, and 
document an orderly mass killing.”259  Or perhaps the more pertinent 
question would be, in light of the condemnatory nature of the 
German official records, whether there will ever be another genocide 
with such an obvious paper trail.  The answer would seem to be no.  
The representatives present during the drafting of the Genocide 
Convention wanted to include a requirement for government 
involvement in the definition of genocide, but did not.260  Therefore, 
while as a general rule government is usually complicit in the 
commission of genocide, it is not beyond the scope of interpretation 
that the definition could be applied to genocide occurring without 
any governmental oversight.261  Even putting that aside, there will be 
nary a government that would risk enacting laws or publishing 
decrees that would enumerate genocidal policies. 
This Comment will assume that, for the purposes of the 
following analysis, genocide can indeed occur under circumstances 
where there seems to be little or no coordination with the 
government.  Of course, “without documentation produced by a state 
bureaucracy with a genocidal mission, the burden of proving intent is 
great.”262  The PTC acknowledged as much when it concluded that, 
inter alia, the paucity of official statements from the Government of 
Sudan was insufficient to lead to a conclusion that genocidal intent 
was the only reasonable inference drawn from the evidence.263  It 
therefore becomes crucial for the cultural context in which the 
violence has taken place to be vividly painted for the trial chamber so 
 
 257  Anderson, supra note 252. 
 258  Id. 
 259  Hong, supra note 249, at 262. 
 260  SCHABAS, supra note 13, at 65. 
 261  Id.  Nevertheless, this restriction on the definition was left out largely due to 
“practical difficulties.”  Id. (quoting U.N. Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4, at 6). 
 262  Hong, supra note 249, at 262. 
 263  Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 165 
(Mar. 4, 2009).  
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that the chamber can make the determination that while Darfur does 
not bear the same features as the Holocaust, it could also be a 
genocide.  The legal representatives of the victims are uniquely 
situated to take on this important task, as they have the most direct 
and sustained contact with Darfuris—either on the ground as 
internally-displaced persons (IDPs) or as refugees. 
2. Cultural Life in Darfur 
The territory of Darfur—meaning “Land of the Fur”—is in West 
Sudan and is approximately the size of France.264  It is home to 
anywhere from forty to ninety tribes, members of which are primarily 
identified both internally and externally as either Arab or non-
Arab.265  The three main non-Arab tribes, the tribes almost exclusively 
targeted by Sudanese military forces and the Janjaweed militia,266 are 
the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa.267  They speak Arabic, as it is the lingua 
franca of the country, but also maintain their tribal languages, which 
play very important roles in passing down histories, stories, and 
culture by way of oral tradition.268  Each tribe also has its own customs, 
traditions, and religious beliefs, the hybridization of which creates the 
overarching, all-encompassing Darfuri culture.269  Still, each tribe 
protects its own personalized part of the culture, with art forms, 
dances, and celebrations.270 
The tribal village is traditionally based on kinship and a sense of 
familial community, as most of the people living in the village are 
related to each other.271  Every Darfuri tribe and its culture is very 
closely attached to its land, which has sustained it for centuries.272  
Each village has a central meeting area called the dara, where 
 
 264  Hong, supra note 249, at 244; DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 9, at 5. 
 265   MEENU MENON, PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, DARFUR: THE CULTURE AND THE 
PEOPLE, available at http://rhin.org/documents/DARFUR_THE_CULTURE_AND 
_THE_PEOPLE_English.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). 
 266  The Janjaweed are informally organized Arab militias, who have joined with 
the Sudanese government in attacking the Darfuri tribes.  HAGAN & RYMOND-
RICHMOND, supra note 12, at 108.  The translation of “Janjaweed” is “evil [or devil] on 
horseback.”  Rebecca Leung, Witnessing Genocide In Sudan, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 
7:49 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/10/08/60minutes/main648277 
.shtml. 
 267  MENON, supra note 265. 
 268  Id. 
 269  Id. 
 270  Id. 
 271  Id. 
 272  Id. 
HON.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2013  3:37 PM 
2013] COMMENT 401 
 
villagers eat meals, socialize, resolve disputes, and discuss the news.273  
The children of the village are also schooled in the dara, learning 
their tribal history, genealogy, and culture from their grandparents, 
particularly their grandmothers.274  Special religious scholars also 
hold sessions for villagers to learn and read the Quran.275  These 
scholars, along with the tribal village chief and the traditional 
healers—whose vocation is passed down from generation to 
generation—are the most important members of the community and 
are highly respected. 
3.  Effect of the Violence on Cultural Life 
The widespread atrocities occurring in Darfur have certainly not 
gone unnoticed and there is much documentation detailing the 
violence.276  One of the most comprehensive reports of the violations 
of international human rights and humanitarian law in Darfur is 
contained in the “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry 
on Darfur to the Secretary-General” (“Darfur Report”), the 
compilation of which was authorized by the U.N. Security Council in 
Resolution 1564 in September 2004.277  The Commission requested, 
and received, materials from various sources “including 
Governments, intergovernmental organizations, various United 
Nations mechanisms or bodies, . . . non-governmental organizations,” 
and “international and regional organizations.”278  Witness interviews 
provided most of the information contained in the reports that 
flooded the Commission, though some information was also gleaned 
from satellite imagery tracing destruction of, and attacks on, villages 
and field visits.279 
Despite the fact that the Commission did not find sufficient 
evidence to justify a conclusion that genocide was being committed,280 
 
 273  MENON, supra note 265. 
 274  Id. 
 275  Id. 
 276  Reports have been compiled by the U.N., governments, and non-
governmental organizations.  See HAGAN & RYMOND-RICHMOND, supra note 12, at xvii–
xx, 3 (The Atrocities Documentation Survey conducted by the U.S. State 
Department); Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
on Darfur to the Secretary-General [hereinafter Darfur Report], delivered to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 31, 2005); DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 9. 
 277  Darfur Report, supra note 276, at 2. 
 278  Id. at ¶ 182. 
 279  Id. at ¶ 183. 
 280  “There is no doubt that some of the objective elements of genocide 
materialized in Darfur. . . . However, . . . other . . . elements . . . show a lack of 
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there is much to support such a finding once the cultural nuances 
are properly taken into account.  In reviewing all of the materials sent 
to the Commission, it reported “hundreds of incidents . . . involving 
the killing of civilians, massacres, summary executions, rape and 
other forms of sexual violence, torture, abduction, looting of 
property and livestock, as well as deliberate destruction and torching 
of villages.”281  The villages are left “burned, completely or partially, 
with only shells of outer walls of the traditional circular houses left 
standing[, with w]ater pumps and wells . . . destroyed, implements for 
food processing wrecked, [and] trees and crops burned and cut 
down.”282  But it is not just the villages and rural areas being 
attacked—towns and cities are not immune either.283  Many towns 
“show signs of damage to homes and essential infrastructure such as 
hospitals, schools and police stations.”284 
Another comprehensive report is “Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic 
Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan,” 
compiled independently by Human Rights Watch (HRW); the report 
is the result of a twenty-five day field mission by members of HRW 
into Darfur.285  In addition to many of the same findings of bombings, 
mass and summary killings, and rape, HRW also found “systematic 
destruction of mosques and the desecration of articles of Islam.”286  
Government forces and the Janjaweed militia “have killed imams[, 
second imams, and muezzins], destroyed mosques and prayer mats, 
[and] torn up and defecated on Qorans.”287 
Such arbitrary and disproportionate violence has led to “massive 
displacement of large parts of the civilian population within Darfur 
and to neighboring Chad.”288  The severity and repetition of attacks 
against the same or surrounding villages often spread fear 
throughout the area, leading entire villages to evacuate and flee to 
more relatively safe areas.289  At the time that the Darfur Commission 
 
genocidal intent. . . . On the basis of the foregoing observations, the Commission 
concludes that the Government of the Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide.” 
Id. at ¶¶ 507, 513, 518. 
 281  Id. at ¶ 186. 
 282  Id. at ¶ 235. 
 283  Darfur Report, supra note 276, at ¶ 235. 
 284  Id. 
 285  DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 9, at 2. 
 286  Id. at 27. 
 287  Id. at 28. 
 288  Id. 
 289  Darfur Report, supra note 276, at ¶ 186. 
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submitted its report to the United Nations, the estimate for refugees 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) numbered around 1.2 
million, with over 700 villages destroyed.290  Those in the IDP camps 
do not fare any better, being akin to “virtual prisoners.”291  They are 
“confined to camps and settlements with inadequate food, shelter 
and humanitarian assistance, at constant risk of further attacks, rape 
and looting of their remaining possessions.”292  The displaced do not 
want to stay in the camps, yet they fear even more returning to their 
homes because of the probability of more attacks, attacks occurring 
with impunity against the civilians.293  In addition, members of the 
Janjaweed sometimes “camp” in the villages they have burned, thus 
ensuring that its inhabitants do not return.294  From these makeshift 
bases, the Janjaweed “mount[] raids across the border into Chad and 
exert[] some control over the movement of displaced persons.  Their 
mere presence close to the border ensure[s] that refugees in Chad 
[do] not attempt to cross back into Darfur to salvage buried grain or 
other belongings.”295 
The destruction of entire villages’ and communities’ ways of life 
is undeniably having a profound impact on local tribal culture.  HRW 
concluded in its report that the human rights violations it witnessed 
“amount[ed] to a government policy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ of certain 
ethnic groups, namely the Fur and the Masalit, from their areas of 
residence.”296  Ethnic cleansing, which has a cultural element to it, is 
also evidence of a genocidal policy.297  Civilians are being subjected to 
“attacks directed against [them], the burning of their villages, the 
mass killings of persons under their control, the forced displacement 
of populations, the destruction of their food stocks, livelihoods and 
the looting of their livestock by government and militia forces,” the 
mistreatment, arrest, imprisonment, and torture of their tribal chiefs, 
 
 290  Id. at ¶¶ 226, 236. The report was submitted in 2005.  See id. 
 291  Id. at ¶ 196. 
 292  Id.  For example, Kalma camp, located in South Darfur near the city of Nyala, 
is facing dire food and water shortages.  Radio Dabanga, Sudan: Food and Water 
Shortage in Kalma Camp, ALL AFRICA, Nov. 1, 2011, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201111021026.html.  The humanitarian coordinator for 
the camp said that the camp has not received food for two months, and they are low 
on fuel so they cannot run the water pumps.  Id.  He accused the Sudanese 
government of intentionally restricting the delivery of supplies to the camp.  Id. 
 293  Darfur Report, supra note 276, at ¶ 197. 
 294  DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 9, at 34. 
 295  Id. 
 296  Id. at 39. 
 297  See supra Part II.C.2. 
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and the violation and destruction of their religious buildings and 
objects.298  These hardships are wrenching the tightly knit and 
kinship-based tribes from their land and tearing family members 
apart.  Once they are forced off their land, these bonds are further 
eroded at the IDP camps, which are in unenviable humanitarian 
condition, and are themselves subject to more attacks.299  All of these 
actions have the cumulative effect of destroying the cultural ties that 
bind the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes. 
C. Linking Cultural Destruction to Proving Genocide 
Being able to depict this cultural state of affairs accurately and 
prominently for the trial chamber at the ICC will have profound 
consequences for the prosecution of Sudanese President al-Bashir for 
genocide.  The legal representatives of the victims should seize the 
opportunity to increase the role that they play at the ICC—within the 
modalities of participation that the court has granted them, of 
course.  This is important to note; there are limitations to the role 
that victims can play.300  They can only use the methods of 
participation that are specified by the statute and authorized by the 
court.301  Nevertheless, by complementing the evidence that the 
prosecutor will be presenting, the representative of the victims can 
help to buttress her argument for genocide by helping to show two 
elements of the crime of genocide: the first is whether the Fur, 
Masalit and Zaghawa tribes fall under the four enumerated 
“protected groups;” the second is whether there was a specific intent 
to commit genocide.302 
Scholars have thoroughly dealt with the first element, on the 
status of the three tribes as protected groups under the Genocide 
Convention, elsewhere and it will not be re-analyzed here.303  The 
second, however, has not yet been sufficiently assessed.  The PTC, in 
denying a warrant of arrest for al-Bashir for genocide due to lack of 
specific intent, noted that the documents and official statements that 
the prosecutor submitted as evidence of such intent could just as 
easily be proof of discrimination or persecution.304  What will help to 
 
 298  DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 9, at 40. 
 299  Darfur Report, supra note 276, at ¶ 327.  Women in particular are in danger of 
rape at the camps.  Id. 
 300  See Cohen, supra note 143, at 352–55. 
 301  Baumgartner, supra note 154, at 425. 
 302  See supra Part II.C and II.D. 
 303  See, e.g., Hong, supra note 249. 
 304  Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
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support those documents will be a strong showing of persecution and 
ethnic cleansing policies pursued by the joint and separate attacks by 
the Sudanese military forces and the Janjaweed militia. 
In fact, there is such evidence suggesting that the intent of the 
Government of Sudan and its proxies, the Janjaweed militia, is to 
destroy, whether in its entirety or partially, the non-Arab tribes of the 
Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa.305  The powerful findings of the clear 
commission of the crime against humanity of persecution,306 the 
crime against humanity of extermination,307 and the undeniable 
ethnic cleansing308—primarily through forced displacement and 
forcible transfer—attest to this.  Persecution and ethnic cleansing are 
both policies on a sliding scale of specific intent, and their coupling 
provides at least a strong argument that those policies are 
genocidal.309 
Of the three types of genocide with which the prosecutor has 
charged al-Bashir—genocide by killing, genocide by causing serious 
bodily or mental harm, and genocide by deliberately inflicting 
conditions of life calculated to bring about physical destruction310—
the charge most amenable to cultural buttressing as articulated above 
is the final one.  The shattering of entire communities and villages 
forcing displacement into camps, which are not safe from attack 
either, is wrenching apart the strong cultural bonds between tribal 
members and forcing them from the land they have occupied and 
claimed for hundreds of years.311  In addition to atrocious living 
conditions, the loss of their support system, cultural histories and 
genealogies, and traditional forms of livelihood is straining the 
 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 167 
(Mar. 4, 2009).   
 305  Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest 
(Pre-Trial Chamber I), No. ICC-02/05-01/09-94, ¶ 5 (July 12, 2010).  
 306  Bashir is not charged with the crime against humanity of persecution, 
interestingly, even though the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur came to the 
conclusion that such a crime was being committed.  See Darfur Report, supra note 276, 
at ¶ 321. 
 307  See id. at ¶ 294 (“The Commission leaves it to the competent court that will 
pronounce on these alleged crimes to determine whether the mass killings may 
amount to extermination as a crime against humanity.”). 
 308  See DARFUR DESTROYED, supra note 9, at 39. 
 309  See generally supra Parts II.C.2 and IV.A. 
 310  While the one provision of the definition of cultural genocide was included in 
the Rome Statute—that of forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group—and as such would be the greatest beneficiary of cultural context, al-Bashir is 
not charged with genocide by forcible transfer of children.   
 311  MENON, supra note 265. 
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identity of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes.312  As Raphael 
Lemkin stated in his seminal articulation of genocide, the destruction 
of the foundational elements of the life of national groups is the 
means by which to annihilate the groups themselves.313  Accordingly, 
culture, and the impact that the violence in Darfur is having on it, 
will play a very important role in the prosecution for genocide.  By 
incorporating numerous and powerful references to the culture of 
the tribes and the disastrous consequences of the attacks, the legal 
representatives of the victims will be able to help develop modern 
genocide jurisprudence, leaving behind the more structured example 
of the Holocaust,314 and bringing to justice arguably one of the 
savviest (or most “hapless”315) perpetrators of genocide the world has 
ever seen. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The creation of the Genocide Convention following the horrors 
of World War II was a missed opportunity for the international 
community to criminalize the intentional destruction, “in whole or in 
part,” of a nation’s culture and identity—cultural genocide.316  While 
the first two drafts contained strong provisions for the protection of 
culture and its tangible manifestations, the final result contained 
none.317  Subsequent events in the world, namely the wars in 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, forced the international community to 
rethink its position on the complete absence of cultural genocide as a 
legal concept.  The ICTY’s jurisprudence carved out a niche for the 
use of cultural genocide as one method for contributing to the 
showing of specific intent for the conviction of traditional 
genocide.318 
The establishment of the ICC, a permanent institution dedicated 
to the pursuance of accountability and justice of perpetrators of 
international criminal law violations, briefly reopened debate about 
whether to incorporate cultural genocide as a separate crime in its 
founding statute.319  Despite the fact that the international community 
 
 312  Id. 
 313  See supra Part I and II.A. 
 314 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 315  Hong, supra note 249, at 261. 
 316  See Rome Statute, supra note 24, at art. 5. 
 317  See supra Part II.A. 
 318  See supra Part II.C.1. 
 319  See supra Part II.D. 
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declined to do so, the statute does contain a unique and 
revolutionary provision: it provides for the legal representation of 
certified victims before the court in a capacity comparable to a third 
party in a case.320  Some modes of participation are proscribed for 
those representatives, but they are nevertheless allowed to engage in 
many of the same proceedings, and participate within them, as the 
prosecution and the defense do.  This novel mechanism has the 
potential to inject cultural recognition and awareness into the trials, 
as the representatives will have the closest contact with the victims 
who experienced the attacks, and will have as great an interest in 
securing convictions for genocide as the prosecutor. 
The case against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is the 
perfect test case for the use of victim participation as a means of 
getting evidence of cultural genocide in as evidence of genocidal 
intent, as contemplated and acknowledged by the ICTY.321  The 
attacks and destruction on tribal villages in Darfur are ripping 
communities apart and uprooting centuries-old villages that have 
strong ties to the land and surrounding area.  The killing of civilians, 
arrest and torture of tribal chiefs, and herding of the survivors into 
camps for the internally-displaced is only continuing to threaten the 
tribal identities of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa.322  The prosecution 
will have a difficult time as it is proving genocide because of the 
dearth of concrete documentary evidence of specific intent to 
destroy.  It would behoove the legal representatives of the victims to 
take advantage of their unique position within the legal structure of 
the court to fervently present to the court the cultural context in 
which the violence is taking place.  Because the events in Darfur do 
not resemble what is considered the epitome of genocide, the 
Holocaust,323 the representatives should urge that without the cultural 
context, the genocidal attacks occurring cannot be properly 
interpreted, and justice cannot be served.324 
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